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Rehabilitating the Nuisance Injunction 
to Protect the Environment 
Doug Rendleman* 
Abstract 
The Trump Administration has reversed the federal 
government’s role of protecting the environment. The reversal 
focuses attention on states’ environmental capacity. This Article 
advocates more vigorous state environmental tort remedies for 
nuisance and trespass.  
An injunction is the superior remedy in most successful 
environmental litigation because it orders correction and 
improvement. Two anachronistic barriers to an environmental 
                                                                                                     
 * E.R. Huntley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School 
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Daniel Farber, John Golden, Alexandria Klass, Douglas Laycock, and Henry 
Smith. Thanks to student research assistants Martha Vazquez, Trista Bishop-
Watt, Jenna Fierstein, Ernest Hammond, Sills O’Keefe, Ryan Starks, and Scott 
Weingart for their help with the citations and footnotes. Thanks also to the 
Frances Lewis Law Center for support. This paper benefitted from comments at 
presentations at the Remedies Discussion Forum at Prato, Italy, the Association 
of Law, Property, and Society at the University of Minnesota, the Faculty Enclave 
at Washington and Lee, and the Property Remedies Discussion Forum at 
Universite Paul Cezanne, Aix Marseille, France. 
This Article’s genesis was years of developing and teaching law school 
casebooks that included Boomer v. Atlantic Cement as a principal decision. 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); DOUG RENDLEMAN, 
COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 
178– 94 (2010); DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES 1208–14 (9th 
ed. 2018) and earlier editions. The casebooks comprise a rough “first draft” of this 
Article. A later draft was published in Europe as a book chapter with a different 
title; its emphasis and conclusions foreshadow this revision. Doug Rendleman, 
Rejecting Property Rules-Liability Rules for Boomer’s Nuisance Remedy: The Last 
Tour You Need of Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral, in REMEDIES AND PROPERTY 
43 (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, Russell Weaver & Francois Lichere 
eds. 2013). This draft was also posted on SSRN in 2013, Number 2212384. From 
the beginning, understanding and reacting to the New York decisions and the 
Cathedral article’s treatment of remedies influenced my teaching and casebooks. 
Over the years, qualifications and refinements surfaced, prompted by developing 
thought and scholarship. 
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injunction are the New York Court of Appeals’ decision, Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement, and Calabresi and Melamed’s early and iconic 
law-and-economics article, One View of the Cathedral. This Article 
examines and criticizes both because, by subordinating the 
injunction to money damages, they undervalue public health and 
environmental protection and militate against effective private-law 
remedies for environmental torts.  
This Article advocates flexible and pragmatic common-law 
techniques instead of law-and-economics analysis. Moreover, 
behavioral economists’ studies have undermined and qualified 
many law-and-economics theories. In addition to arguing for more 
and better injunctions, this Article criticizes the law-and-economics 
mindset that nuisance-trespass parties’ post-injunction negotiation 
will convert an injunction into an excessive money settlement. It 
also shows that the Cathedral article’s vocabulary and four-rule 
organization are both too long and too short as well as confusing 
and misleading.  
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I. Introduction 
As the first half of the Trump Administration ends, the federal 
government’s environmental goal is deregulation.1 The EPA and 
the Departments of Energy and Interior are unraveling 
long-standing environmental policies through executive and 
administrative measures.2 The Harvard Law School 
Environmental and Energy Law Program sends regular emails 
updating the Administration’s deregulatory trajectory. Setbacks 
for environmental protection include rescission of or weakened 
federal government support for the Paris Climate accord, the 
Clean Power Plan, the Clean Water Rule, and national 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Nadja Popovich et al., 76 Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/ 
climate/trump- environment-rules-reversed.html (last updated July 6, 2018) (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (stating that “the Trump Administration has sought to 
reverse more than 70 environmental regulations” in accordance with its priority 
of eliminating federal regulations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 2. See id. (tracking policies that have been overturned, or which are in the 
process of being overturned, through the administrative, executive, legislative, 
and judicial processes). 
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monuments.3 One of the most serious retreats is the proposal to 
freeze fuel efficiency standards for cars and trucks through 2026.4  
The federal government’s retreat focuses attention on state, 
local, and private initiatives.5 As part of the complex legal 
environment, this Article examines remedies for private 
nuisances. With an eye to augmented private-law nuisance and 
related trespass remedies, it argues for more and more-detailed 
injunctions as environmental remedies. The injunction is the 
remedy that a court can use to forbid misconduct and order positive 
conduct. In public-law regulatory litigation, the court’s choice is 
between an injunction and nothing.6 But in the private-law 
litigation this Article examines, the court’s choice is between an 
injunction and damages.7  
Two barriers to a more robust environmental injunction have 
passed their fortieth birthdays and are primed for mid-life crises 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Regulatory Rollback Tracker, ENVTL. L. AT HARV., 
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/policy-initiative/regulatory-rollback-tracker/ 
(last updated Sept. 25, 2018) (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (tracking key regulatory 
rollbacks of the Trump Administration, including rollbacks having to do with the 
Paris Climate Agreement, Clean Power Plan, Clean Water Rule, and reduced size 
of national monument land) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
See also Richard L. Revesz, Opinion, On Climate, the Facts and Law are Against 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/opinion/climate-report-trump.html (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See Brady Dennis & Michael Laris, California Blasts Trump Proposal to 




d1c3da28d6b6_story.html?utm_term=.eec49c826e9f (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) 
(discussing California’s resistance to this measure) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 5. See Karen Sloan, NYU Law Center to Help State AGs Protect 
Environment, LAW.COM (Aug. 21, 2017, 2:30 PM), 
https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/08/21/nyu-law-center-to-help-state-ags-
protect-environment/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (“New York University initiated a 
State Energy & Environmental Impact Center for state governments to turn to 
as a resource in developing state and local efforts.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). See generally Mark Nevitt & Robert V. Percival, Could 
Official Climate Denial Revive the Common Law as a Regulatory Backstop?, 96 
WASH. U. L. REV. 441 (2018). 
 6. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1976). 
 7. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 871–75 (N.Y. 1970). 
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and reconsideration. These are the New York Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement8 and Calabresi and 
Melamed’s nearly contemporaneous Cathedral article.9 This 
Article will re-examine both to bring some perspective to their 
remarkable longevity and their influence in favoring damages over 
injunctions, to express skepticism about each, and to develop 
qualifications and refinements. 
Major among other pressing environmental problems, global 
warming and climate change defy a single solution.10 Ameliorative 
techniques range from altering individual habits to local, regional, 
national, and international measures.11 Both private-law 
approaches, like nuisance, and public-law regulation, litigation 
and regulation are available legal techniques against global 
warming and climate change.12  
Sympathetic with augmented protection for the environment, 
I wrote this Article from my perspective in the remedies branch of 
process-oriented legal realism. By arguing for more and 
more-detailed injunctions, I hope to strike a small blow against 
environmental deterioration, including, in the long run, global 
warming and climate change. 
After short introductions, this Article turns in Part II to the 
example of a neighboring property owner’s particulate-pollution 
private-nuisance lawsuit based on Boomer. The Article moves in 
Part III to the Cathedral article’s four options for a nuisance court’s 
solution to the pollution problem. It discusses each of the options 
and the choices between them.  
In brief, Boomer and the Cathedral article favor damages over 
injunctions and militate against optimal pollution remedies.13 Part 
IV adds some further considerations and suggestions under a new 
                                                                                                     
 8. 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
 9. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  
 10. See Responding to Climate Change, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., 
https://climate.nasa.gov/solutions/adaptation-mitigation/ (last updated Aug. 28, 
2018) (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 11. See id.  
 12. See F. Andrew Hessick, The Challenge of Remedies, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
739, 741 (2013). 
 13. See Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 875; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 9, at 1121.  
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general head of “Rule 5.” The final Part V before the Conclusion, 
Part VI, explains procedural considerations related to the 
plaintiff’s injunction remedy. 
A. Remedy 
A remedy, as this Article uses the term, is what a court can do 
for a successful plaintiff. The antecedent issue of the defendant’s 
substantive liability is distinct from, but not divorced from, the 
later question of the plaintiff’s remedy.14 “[T]he creation of a right,” 
Justice Thomas wrote in eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,15 “is 
distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that 
right.”16 The successful plaintiff’s remedy should advance, at least 
it should not retard, the substantive law’s policy. Except in one 
segment, this Article assumes that the defendant is liable to the 
plaintiff under the substantive law and examines what the court 
can do as a remedy for the successful plaintiff.  
The court’s remedial inquiry invokes its judgment on two 
general issues. First, the court must choose the plaintiff’s remedy. 
In this Article, the court’s principal choice is how to deploy two 
remedies, compensatory damages and an injunction.17 The court’s 
ancillary remedial choices concern punitive damages and 
restitution.18 Second, after choosing the plaintiff’s remedy, the 
court must measure or define it.19 If the court, judge or jury, 
awards the plaintiff compensatory damages, what amount should 
they be?20 If the court grants the plaintiff an injunction, what of 
the defendant’s conduct should it require or forbid?21  
                                                                                                     
 14. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Foreword: The Forms 
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 47 (1979). 
 15. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 16. Id. at 392. 
 17. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 18. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.3–4. 
 19. See discussion infra Part V. 
 20. See discussion infra Part V. 
 21. See discussion infra Part V. 
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B. Regulation Versus Litigation 
But, someone will ask, isn’t environmental administrative law 
top-down regulation based on federal statutes instead of 
litigation-based, state common law trespass and nuisance? Federal 
regulation is necessary and has been successful for many national 
problems. Decentralized private tort litigation, in addition to 
compensating individuals, complements public regulation.22 As 
Professor Klass has shown, state common law is an important part 
of environmental protection.23 Mr. Abelkop has added: 
[E]nvironmental and public health problems call for multiple 
policy instruments, and tort law and public regulatory rules 
usually operate as complements, not substitutes 
. . . . Ultimately, the choice of policy instruments will turn on 
contextual factors including the nature of the problem, the 
attributes of the parties involved, the political climate, the 
available data, and some manifestation of the evaluative 
criteria.24 
The Trump Administration’s retreat increases private law’s 
role.25 Lawyers seeking to protect the environment have numerous 
reasons to turn to state common law nuisance and trespass. State 
and federal regulation may be absent, lax, or difficult to enforce.26 
                                                                                                     
 22. See Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an Environmental Policy 
Instrument, 92 OR. L. REV. 381, 385 (2013) (stating that “tort law and public 
regulation are complements, not substitutes”). 
 23. See Alexandria B. Klass, CERCLA, State Law and Federalism in the 21st 
Century, 41 SW. L. REV. 679, 680 (2012).  
 24. Abelkop, supra note 22, at 464; see also Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience 
of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 887 (2013); Richard A. Epstein, Modern 
Environmentalists Overreach: A Plea for Understanding Background Common 
Law Principles, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 3435 (2014).  
 25. See Chris Mooney, Trump Withdrew from the Paris Climate Deal a Year 
Ago. Here’s What has Changed, WASH. POST (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/06/01/ 
trump-withdrew-from-the-paris-climate-plan-a-year-ago-heres-what-has-changed/ 
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.89f12c5a84fc (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with 
theWashingtonand Lee Law Review). See generally Nevitt & Percival, supra note 
5. 
 26. See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental 
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 130–33 (2005) (discussing problems with 
environmental regulation and jurisdiction, noting that absence, form, and 
enforcement of regulation pose difficulties). 
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Government regulation may move at a snail’s pace.27 An agency 
may be captured by the industry it is charged to regulate.28 
Legislators may be in thrall to campaign contributors.29 The 
plaintiffs may be powerless minorities who lack representation in 
the legislature or a voice in the agency.30 Regulation has gaps; 
examples are gasoline storage tanks and fracking.31 The regulatory 
scheme may lack important remedies, compensatory damages, 
punitive damages, restitution, and injunctions. “Regulation” 
through common law courts’ civil injunctions may be flexible 
enough to allow innovative solutions.32 In 2017, California coastal 
communities filed climate-control actions for damages against 
energy companies because of expected costs from rising sea 
levels.33 In 2017 and 2018, Boulder, Colorado, New York City, and 
other municipal governments prepared and filed climate-change 
public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass lawsuits against 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Stuart Shapiro, Why does it Take so Long to Issue a Regulation?, HILL 
(May 19, 2015, 7:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-
administration/242468-why-does-it-take-so-long-to-issue-a-regulation (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See Scott Hempling, “Regulatory Capture”: Sources and Solutions, 1 
EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY & REV. 23, 24–25 (2014) (defining 
regulatory capture as a situation in which the regulated entity “has more 
influence than what the public interest requires”).  
 29. See Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the 
Legislative Process, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 100–01 (2014). 
 30. See Amber Phillips, The Striking Lack of Diversity in State Legislatures, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/01/26/the-real-problem-with-diversifying-congress-state-
legislatures-are-even-less-diverse/?utm_term=.d68adaa7cc8a (last visited Dec. 3, 
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. See, e.g., Oil Pollution Prevention, 112 C.F.R. § 112 (2017) (providing 
only regulation for spill prevention and response to spills); see also PUB. CITIZEN, 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING–UNSAFE, UNREGULATED 1–3 (2018), https://www.citizen. 
org/sites/default/files/hydraulicfracturing_fs.pdf (describing that fracking poses 
unregulated risks to drinking water). 
 32. See Abelkop, supra note 22, at 387; Stephen B Burbank, Sean Farhang 
& Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 713 
(2013); Klass, supra note 23, at 680. 
 33. Jenna Greene, New Tactic in Climate Control Litigation Could Cost 
Energy Companies Billions. Or Not, RECORDER (July 20, 2017), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202793545435/New-Tactic-in-Climate-
Change-Litigation-Could-Cost-Energy-Companies-Billions-Or-
Not/?mcode=1202617583589&curindex=405 (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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energy companies.34 As Professor Sharkey wrote, common law 
courts should “effectively incorporate input from federal agencies, 
while at the same time ensuring that such agencies do not 
overreach.”35 
C. Rational Choices, Behavioral Economics, and Positive Law 
This Article presents two perspectives for analyzing legal and 
economic decision-making. On the one hand, a theory-driven 
economic-analysis approach bases human decisions on economic 
motives and often finds clear-cut answers.36 On the other hand, a 
pragmatic and empirical view recognizes that human nature is 
variable and that law is ambiguous and process driven.37 The rise 
of behavioral economic scholarship has strengthened this 
                                                                                                     
 34. Eric Waeckerlin & Christopher Chrisman, Coming to Colorado—Climate 
Change Nuisance Suits, HOLLAND & HART LLP (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.hollandhart.com/coming-to-colorado-climate-change-nuisance-suits 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
These lawsuits raise complex defensive, proof, and procedural issues that this 
Article does not examine. Among them are standing, class action certification, 
causation, public versus private nuisance, federal preemption and displacement. 
See Good v. American Water Works Co., No. 2:14-01374, 2015 WL 3540509, at *3, 
*8–10 (S.D. W. Va. June 4, 2015) (discussing economic loss rule and public-private 
nuisance); Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., 801 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 
2015) (refusing a nuisance class action); Price v. Martin, 79 So. 3d 960, 977 (La. 
2011) (refusing to certify state-court plaintiff class); Merrick v. Diageo Americas 
Supply, 805 F.3d 685, 695 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that the federal Clean Air Act 
does not preempt state common law tort claims); Bell v. Cheswick Generating 
Station, 734 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that federal Clean Air Act did 
not preempt state common law tort claims), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2696 (2014); 
Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 94 (Iowa 2014) (finding that 
federal Clean Air Act does not preempt state common law tort claims); American 
Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 422–23 (2011) (stating that the 
Clean Air Act displaces federal common law emissions-abatement lawsuit and 
putting into question state lawsuits against pollution that originated outside its 
borders); Anderson v. Teck Metals, Ltd., No. CV-13-420-LRS, 2015 WL 59100, at 
*10 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2015) (finding that in a pollution lawsuit against a 
Canadian defendant, CERCLA displaces federal common law public nuisance, 
and that state public nuisance law was inapplicable outside the state). 
 35. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law: 
Regulatory Substitutes or Compliments?, 65 EMORY L.J. 1705, 1734 (2016). 
 36. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 
757, 762–67 (1975) (discussing economic theory and arguing that individuals 
engage in predictable behavior regarding the law). 
 37. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 256 (2011). 
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approach. Differing basic ways of looking at the law emerge below. 
How does human decision-making work? Taking my cue from 
behavioral economic scholarship and earlier Legal Realists, Felix 
Cohen38 and Leon Green,39 I argue that the pragmatic and 
functional approach should supplement or replace theory. 
The Cathedral article, which emphasized that it takes only 
“one” view of the Cathedral, left room for other views.40 Judge 
Calabresi’s 2016 book assimilates behavioral economics, another 
view, and rejects dogmatic economic theory that elevates 
micro-theory over law; his book favors economics that are flexible 
enough to accept positive-law developments.41 Professor Hackney 
maintains that then-professor Calabresi’s scholarship in the 1970s 
was a precursor for behavioral economics.42 The Cathedral article 
is more tentative and nuanced than many later more theory-driven 
and dogmatic economic-analysis scholars.43 This Article follows 
Judge Calabresi’s later work and refers to the theory-driven view 
as economic analysis.  
Although they have been supplemented by professionally 
trained economists, the Cathedral article and other early law and 
economics studies were written by economic autodidacts.44 Early 
law-and-economics scholars emphasized a rational-choice 
perspective.45 The rational-choice model holds that people make 
                                                                                                     
 38. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional 
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821–34 (1935). 
 39. See generally LEON GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (2d ed. 
1977). 
 40. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1128.  
 41. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW & ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN 
REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 4–7 (2016) (endorsing behavioral economics, adding 
that “there will be times when even an expanded economic theory will not be able 
to explain legal reality”). 
 42. See James R. Hackney Jr., Guido Calabresi and the Construction of 
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 63–64 
(2014) (asserting that Calabresi’s work reflects a trend towards a more 
methodologically flexible approach to scholarship in the law-and-economics field). 
 43. This Article leaves out parts of the Cathedral article’s analysis; for 
example, its discussion of the inalienable. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 9, at 1111–15. 
 44. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and 
Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1033, 1083–84 (2012).  
 45. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
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planned and controlled decisions to advance their personal 
economic utility.46  
Economic-analysis scholarship seeks the most efficient way to 
resolve a dispute.47 In contrast to most remedies scholarship, it 
looks to the future through deterrence by signaling economic 
incentives to a potential defendant to prevent future casualties and 
to identify the lowest cost avoider.48 Deterrence is prospective not 
retrospective. The seeker for deterrence may view the plaintiff’s 
receipt of compensatory damages as almost incidental. Deterrence 
is less connected to either the parties’ present litigation or to the 
plaintiff’s actual or potential loss. It is more of a reason to take 
money from the defendant than it is a reason to give the 
defendant’s money to the plaintiff.  
Court decisions, legal reasoning based on values, policies, and 
legal rules, in contrast, usually examine money transfers from the 
defendant to the plaintiff under the heading of compensation in 
addition to lower-priority deterrence and punishment.49 
Economic analysis’ vocabulary is difficult even for a specialist 
to decode, what’s more a merely educated lawyer.50 It is too 
abstruse for most lawyers and judges.51 And it is inaccessible, and 
sometimes imperfectly applied.52 Written for a scholarly audience, 
it may cloak a conservative political agenda that favors business 
defendants over tort plaintiffs and de-emphasizes environmental 
protection.  
Contemporary behavioral economics, based on empirical 
research, qualifies and rejects rational-choice theory: 
Standard economics assumes that we are rational—that we 
know all the pertinent information about our decisions, that we 
                                                                                                     
1051, 1055 (2000). 
 46. See JONATHAN LEVIN & PAUL MILGROM, INTRODUCTION TO CHOICE THEORY 
2–6 (2004), https://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ%20202/Choice%20Theory.pdf. 
 47. See Posner, supra note 36, at 760. 
 48. Cf. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the 
Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1031–33 (2001). 
 49. See Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, Meet Economics; Economics, Meet 
Remedies, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 72 (2018). 
 50. See Jeffrey Berryman, The Law of Remedies: A Prospectus for Teaching 
and Scholarship, 10 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 123, 130 (2010). 
 51. See id. at 130. 
 52. Id. 
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can calculate the value of the different options we face, and that 
we are cognitively unhindered in weighing the ramifications of 
each potential choice. The result is that we are presumed to be 
making logical and sensible decisions . . . . On the basis of these 
assumptions, economists draw far-reaching conclusions about 
everything from shopping trends to law to public policy. 
But, . . . we are all far less rational in our decision making than 
standard economic theory assumes . . . . So wouldn’t it make 
sense to modify standard economics and move away from naive 
psychology, which often fails the tests of reason, introspection, 
and—most importantly—empirical scrutiny? Wouldn’t 
economics make a lot more sense if it were based on how people 
actually behave, instead of how they should behave?53 
People are not always rational maximizing machines. They 
are emotional and error-prone cusses who often act contrary to 
their own pecuniary self-interest.54 “Our species is not Homo 
economicus. At the end of the day, it emerges as something more 
complicated and interesting. We are Homo sapiens, imperfect 
beings, soldiering on with conflicting impulses through an 
unpredictable, implacably threatening world, doing our best with 
what we have.”55 The behavioral limits on rational choice comprise 
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded 
self-interest.56  
One behavioral legal economist insisted that “[t]he battle to 
separate the economic analysis of legal rules and institutions from 
the straightjacket of strict rational choice assumptions has been 
won by the proponents of ‘behavioral law and economics.’”57 
However, some readers’ reactions to a draft of this Article 
showcased the durability of rational-choice sentiment. 
“The purpose of studying economics[,]” English economist 
Joan Robinson wrote, “is not to acquire a set of ready-made 
answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being 
                                                                                                     
 53. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION: 
THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 317 (2009). 
 54. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 4 (2011). 
 55. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE SOCIAL CONQUEST OF EARTH 251 (2012).  
 56. See RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS 258 (2015). 
 57. Russel Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and 
Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653, 1653 (2011). 
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deceived by economists.”58 I am not a stranger to economic 
analysis.59 Nevertheless, I agree with Professor Sterk’s 
observation that “any attempt to justify legal rules exclusively in 
efficiency terms is fatally flawed.”60  
The major part of my analysis is common law, usually what 
has happened in the courts throughout the land. One impediment 
the legal scholar encounters is the vacuum that he must fill with 
research. Theory-driven approaches, on the other hand, can state 
the problem, turn the theory’s crank, and announce the result that 
emerges. As Professor Douglas Laycock observed, “many 
law-and-economics scholars,” who follow economic theory, exhibit 
disinterest “in reading cases or mastering doctrine.”61 Research in 
primary sources can be dull and frustrating, but it is indispensable 
to responsible scholarship. 
The United States has no single private-law court. Each state 
and the District of Columbia has its own procedure, legal culture, 
economy, and legal system with final appellate last-word in its own 
supreme or other final court. Restatements, national treatises, and 
scholarship in law reviews supply some uniformity. Terminology 
varies within and between systems. By the time many of the 
decisions under study reach appeal, the legal questions are close 
enough to be decided either way. Moreover, judges write decisions 
that support the result they reach. Courts, the researcher finds, 
muddle through, often reaching contrasting and inconsistent 
                                                                                                     
 58. JOAN ROBINSON, MARX, MARSHALL AND KEYNES 30 (1955). 
 59. I co-authored one of the first law school applications of Tom Schelling’s 
game theory; see Chapter 13 of OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 
(2d ed. 1984), now Chapter 9 of DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: 
INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT (2010) (discussing the 
injunction and its relation to game theory). Additional economic analysis can be 
found in DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES 46–48 (discussing 
lost earning capacity), 46–48 (discussing wrongful death damages), 68–69 
(discussing pain and suffering damages), 116 (discussing the collateral source 
rule), 360 (discussing the preliminary injunction standard), 722–25 (discussing 
expectancy damages for breach of contract), 786–809 (discussing “efficient” 
opportunistic breach of contract), 842–43 (discussing special-consequential 
damages), 876–84 (discussing lost-volume sellers), 884–900 (discussing 
liquidated damages) (9th ed. 2018). 
 60. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
55, 104 (1987). 
 61. Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (And the 
Doctrinal Train Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L. 1, 20 (2012). 
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decisions on similar facts.62 Research in appellate and some 
trial-court decisions is imperfect and messy.  
The positive-law writer must discover what the courts decide 
in actual disputes. This requires him to find and read court 
decisions, mostly appellate, which reflect the universe of disputes. 
This research is difficult and imprecise. Its conclusions are often 
tentative. The late Christopher Lasch observed that: 
[W]e have writing in which theory, so-called, is allowed to set 
the questions and determine the answers in advance. Theory, 
so-called, has become the latest panacea, the latest source of 
ready-made answers, the latest substitute for thought. 
Thinking is hard work and often very frustrating, since it only 
seems to yield provisional conclusions and to leave one in a 
greater muddle than ever, and so intellectuals yearn to be 
released from that burden, to find some secret formula that will 
give them definitive, comforting answers and make it 
unnecessary for them to go through this terrible labor of 
thought.63 
I have tried to find and analyze factually similar nuisance and 
encroachment decisions. Several related bodies of tort, property, 
environmental, and remedies law compete for the researcher’s 
attention—mistaken improver, adverse possession, easements, 
pollution control, and, if a government agency is involved, eminent 
domain. I summarize decisions to illustrate and support my points. 
II. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 
This Article turns to the archetype land-use dispute, Boomer 
v. Atlantic Cement.64 Atlantic Cement’s factory was emitting 
particulate pollution that distressed surrounding property 
owners.65 What is neighbor Boomer to do? Although there were 
multiple plaintiffs, for clarity and simplification, this Article 
sometimes uses the singular for the plaintiff side of the lawsuit. 
                                                                                                     
 62. See John C. McCoid II, Inconsistent Judgments, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
487, 487 (1991) (describing how judges arrive at inconsistent opinions in lawsuits 
containing identical issues). 
 63. Casey Blake & Christopher Phelps, History as Social Criticism: 
Conversations with Christopher Lasch, 80 J. AM. HIST. 1310, 1324–25 (1994). 
 64. 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
 65. Id. at 871–72. 
REHABILITATING THE NUISANCE INJUNCTION 1873 
How should the court respond? An environmental tort is major 
complex litigation with several substantive theories: nuisance, 
trespass, negligence, strict liability, and violation of environmental 
statutes, such as CERCLA.66 For clarity and simplification, this 
Article focuses on nuisance and trespass. 
The Boomer court accepted Atlantic Cement’s substantive tort 
liability for a private nuisance.67 It focused on plaintiff Boomer’s 
remedy.68 The court considered the utility of Atlantic Cement’s 
development and the plant’s harm to plaintiff’s use and decided 
that the plant had greater “value” than Boomer’s use of his 
property.69 The court granted the “winning” plaintiff compensatory 
damages instead of an injunction.70 “From the attempt to maintain 
the sanctity of rights in property against social encroachment came 
a de facto, but not de jure, damage remedy for injuries to rights in 
land otherwise abatable by injunction,” my late colleague Professor 
Louise Halper concluded.71  
The court was influenced by the negative impact that 
shuttering the factory would have on the local economy.72 As the 
dissent points out, however, an injunction wouldn’t necessarily 
have ended the defendant’s operation.73 The dissent also 
emphasized the cement company’s power to take now and pay later 
as well as the pollution’s deleterious effect on public health.74  
The New York Court of Appeals’ Boomer decision has held its 
law school audience for generations.75 First-year Property and 
Torts casebooks feature Boomer as a principal case along with 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Klass, supra note 23, at 693–94 (explaining that on a theory of 
negligence per se, courts “have used federal, state, and local environmental 
statutes and regulations to help define the duty of care and to serve as a basis for 
liability”). 
 67. See Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 871. 
 68. See id. at 871–75. 
 69. See id.  
 70. Id. at 875. 
 71. Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 89, 130 (1998). 
 72. See Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 872. 
 73. Id. at 877 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 875–77 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
 75. See Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common 
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 7, 8 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J. Lazarus 
eds., 2005).  
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Spur Industries, which is discussed below.76 Because of the court’s 
choice between damages and an injunction in environmental 
litigation, Boomer is also a natural teaching case for upper-level 
                                                                                                     
 76. For property casebooks with Boomer and Spur as principal cases, see 
JOHN E. CRIBBET, ROGER W. FINDLEY, ERNEST E. SMITH & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, 
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 679–88 (9th ed. 2008) (presenting Boomer and 
Spur); JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H. 
SCHILL & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 742–58 (9th ed. 2018) (presenting 
the cases in what is probably the most widely used casebook); THOMAS W. MERRILL 
& HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 965–83 (3rd ed. 2012) 
(presenting Boomer and Spur). However, one casebook summarizes Boomer and 
Spur in Notes and names the injunction and damages as possible remedies. See 
DAVID L. CALLIES, DANIEL R. MANDELKER, & J. GORDON HYLTON, PROPERTY LAW 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND MATERIALS 153–54 (4th ed. 2016). For torts 
casebooks containing either case, see GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JOSEPH SANDERS & W. 
JONATHAN CARDI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1230–40 (5th ed. 
2012) (presenting Boomer as a principal case, with Spur in the notes); RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 612 (11th ed. 
2016) (presenting Boomer as a principal case); MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. 
RABIN, MICHAEL D. GREEN & MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 
688–702 (10th ed. 2016) (presenting Boomer as a principal case, with Spur in the 
notes); JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT 
LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 866 (4th ed. 2016) (beginning presentation of 
Boomer); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, 
WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 867–77 (13th ed. 2015) 
(presenting Boomer and Spur as principal cases).  
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courses in Remedies77 and Environmental Law.78 Scholars have 
written important chapters and leading articles about the 
remedies issues in Boomer.79  
                                                                                                     
 77. See Candace S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, JEAN C. LOVE & GRANT S. NELSON, 
EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES: CASES AND MATERIALS 803–23 
(8th ed. 2011) (presenting Boomer and Spur as principal cases); GEORGE KUNEY, 
EXPERIENCING REMEDIES 482–88 (2015) (presenting Boomer); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK 
& RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 419– 22 
(5th ed. 2019) (presenting Boomer and Spur in note discussions); DOUG 
RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1208–15 
(9th ed. 2018) (presenting Boomer as a principal case, referencing Spur in the 
notes); EMILY SHERWIN & SAMUEL L. BRAY, AMES, CHAFEE, AND RE ON REMEDIES: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 478–87 (2nd ed. 2018) (Boomer and Spur presented as 
principal cases); ELAINE W. SHOBEN, WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, RACHEL M. JANUTIS 
& THOMAS ORIN MAIN, REMEDIES: CASES AND PROBLEMS 88–94, 410–11 (6th ed. 
2016) (presenting Boomer, with Spur in the notes); TRACY A. THOMAS, DAVID I. 
LEVINE & DAVID J. JUNG, REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 137–38 (6th ed. 2017) 
(referencing Boomer within Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 
273 (7th Cir. 1992)); RUSSELL L. WEAVER, DAVID F. PARTLETT, MICHAEL B. KELLY 
& W. JONATHAN CARDI, REMEDIES: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 330–40 (4th ed. 
2016) (presenting Boomer and Spur in section on experimental and conditional 
injunctions); see also DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 178–94 (2010) (presenting Boomer, with 
Spur in the notes). The Torts and Property courses at Washington and Lee and 
many other law schools have been attenuated to four credit hours each. I have 
sometimes found in my upper-level Remedies class that none of the students have 
covered Boomer in their first year of law school, a pity. 
 78. ROBERT PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES 
P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 79–80 (8th ed. 
2018) (including Boomer as part of a discussion on private nuisance written to 
maintain that private nuisance is “grossly inadequate” for addressing modern 
industrial pollution). This Article, on the other hand, maintains that private 
nuisance has a role in dealing with pollution. 
 79. See, e.g., Daniel Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and 
Nuisance Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
JOHN E. CRIBBET 7, 17 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988); Daniel A. 
Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW STORIES 7, 20, 22, 23 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J. Lazarus eds., 2005); W. 
Page Keeton & Clarence Morris, Notes on “Balancing the Equities”, 18 TEX. L. 
REV. 412, 412–25 (1940); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in 
the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 571–76 (2007); Laycock, 
supra note 61, at 1–2; John P. S. McLaren, The Common Law Nuisance Actions 
and the Environmental Battle—Well-Tempered Swords or Broken Reeds?, 10 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 505, 547 (1972); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance 
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. 
REV. 1075, 1075 (1980); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1719, 1719–21 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in 
the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 974–75 (2004) (discussing 
information-cost theory, compensatory damages, compensated injunctions, and 
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Boomer, Professor Farber concludes, lives on in law school 
because it is “a great teaching tool . . . . Generations of law 
students have wondered whether, in this battle between David and 
Goliath, Goliath should walk away so apparently unscathed, 
leaving a battered David with nothing but a few coins for his 
trouble.”80 However, many scholars, law teachers, and other 
observers, including many Washington and Lee law students, 
favor the Boomer court’s damages-only remedy, a position that this 
Article reprobates.81 For my pedagogical purposes, however, the 
Boomer decision performs an important service because the 
teaching value of a simple, but faulty, decision is clear.82  
The reason Professor Laycock refers to the Boomer decision as 
a “train wreck” is that the Court of Appeals rewrote doctrinal 
history without acknowledging that it had.83 The court started 
with the inaccurate premise that the New York common law of 
nuisance remedies required a judge to grant a nuisance plaintiff 
an injunction when the plaintiff’s loss from the defendant’s activity 
was “substantial.”84 Thus, if the plaintiff’s loss surmounted that 
minimum threshold, the judge would grant an injunction without 
considering what it cost the defendant to abate the nuisance.85 The 
Boomer court claimed an innovation for its decision to compare 
plaintiffs’ benefit from an injunction, which it stated as permanent 
                                                                                                     
the exclusion regime); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: 
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1742 (2007) 
(employing information-cost theory to compare “the more tort-like copyright 
regime and the more property-like patent law”); Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 
1285 (2008); John W. Wade, Environmental Protection, The Common Law of 
Nuisance and the Restatement of Torts, 8 F., ABA SECT. INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE, 
& COMPENSATION L. 165, 174 (1972); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Note, Injunction 
Negotiations: An Economic, Moral, and Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1563, 
1563 (1975) (discussing negotiations regarding property right enforcement in the 
form of injunctions and the contempt proceedings that may follow); Comment, 
Internalizing Externalities: Nuisance Law and Economic Efficiency, 53 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 219, 219–20 (1978) (discussing economic efficiency and nuisance law with 
reference to Boomer). 
 80. Farber, supra note 75, at 42. 
 81. See id.  
 82. See id.  
 83. Laycock, supra note 61, at 7–8. 
 84. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970). 
 85. See id. 
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damages of $185,000 with defendant’s cost to comply with a 
shutdown injunction, closing a $45,000,000 plant and dismissing 
over 300 workers.86  
As Professor Halper demonstrated in 1990, however, the 
Boomer decision was really nothing new for New York.87 The 
Boomer court had overlooked a “large body of [New York] law on 
undue hardship.”88 “Boomer was no innovation,” Laycock also 
concluded in 2012 after he “independently reviewed” Halper’s 
research and “further confirmed her general account.”89  
This Article will, in addition, criticize the Boomer decision 
below as badly reasoned and incorrectly decided. 
A. Pollution, Nuisance, and Trespass 
Should a property owner like Boomer, who lives on the edge of 
an industrial site, be subjected to the health hazards and 
uncompensated property depreciation caused by a cement factory’s 
particulate pollution? The factory’s operation interferes with the 
owner’s enjoyment, indeed his possession, of his land.  
In economists’ parlance, an industrial proprietor’s negative 
externality is the incidental harmful effect that its activity has on 
others, an effect that the proprietor is not legally responsible for 
and may ignore.90 A negative externality means that the proprietor 
has captured the benefits of its operation while distributing some 
of its costs to others.91  
A court may create legal responsibility for the proprietor’s 
activity and define remedial consequences that force it to consider 
the affected property owners.92 The court’s remedial decision will 
structure the proprietor’s incentives to “internalize the 
                                                                                                     
 86. See id. at 873 n.*. 
 87. Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court 
of Appeals, 1850–1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 302 (1990). 
 88. Laycock, supra note 61, at 10. 
 89. Id. at 8, 10 n.46. 
 90. See Negative Externality, FUNDAMENTAL FINANCE, 
http://economics.fundamentalfinance.com/negative-externality.php (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
91. Id.  
92. See J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law, 
21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 192 (2003).  
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externality.”93 Courts have used nuisance and trespass substantive 
law and injunction and damages remedies to constrain neighbors’ 
nuisances and trespasses and to suppress externalities.94  
A landowner plaintiff sues a defendant for a nuisance to 
protect his right to use and enjoy his property. Nuisance involves 
less-palpable invasions, for example a defendants’ noise, odor, and 
vibrations.95 Courts adopted nuisance as the private-law 
foundation for modern environmental law.96 Most decisions 
discussed below are nuisance-based. A legal researcher will find 
the substantive law of private nuisance a puzzle.97 Both 
Restatements of Torts will cause more puzzlement.98 
Trespass to land is a related tort that blends into the tort of 
nuisance.99 A trespass involves a defendant casting something 
with size and weight that impinges on the plaintiff landowner’s 
land.100 Many of the decisions we review below stemmed from 
defendants’ encroachments on plaintiffs’ property. A court will use 
                                                                                                     
 93. Id.  
 94. See id. at 192 n.37. 
 95. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF 
TORTS: PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES § 402 (2d ed. 2011). 
 96. See id. § 398. See generally Nevitt & Percival, supra note 5. 
 97. See William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 
(1942) (referring to nuisance as a “legal garbage can”). In the fourth edition of his 
Torts treatise, mellowed by the intervening years, Prosser said that nuisance was 
merely an “impenetrable jungle.” WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971). Confirmation for these conclusions will be found in John 
W. Wade, Environmental Protection, The Common Law of Nuisance and the 
Restatement of Torts, 8 F., ABA SECT. OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE, & 
COMPENSATION L. 165, 170–72 (1972) (describing the complex evolution of private 
nuisance law), and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 
1979). 
 98. Professor Halper explained why this puzzlement occurs in Louise A. 
Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot. See Halper, supra note 71, at 119–28, 130 
(considering the Restatement in light of the assertion that nuisance is 
unprincipled); see also Farber, supra note 75, at 10–13. Professor Fraley 
maintains that the Second Restatement of Torts’ negligence approach to nuisance 
was a mistake. See Jill Fraley, Liability for Unintentional Nuisances 1 (Wash. & 
Lee Pub. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 2018-14, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3216539 (forthcoming 
publication in the West Virginia Law Review). 
 99. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 51. 
 100. Id. § 57. 
REHABILITATING THE NUISANCE INJUNCTION 1879 
the trespass tort to protect the owner’s right to use and possess the 
land and its physical integrity.101 
Although Boomer might have characterized Atlantic’s 
migrating particulates as trespasses, the plaintiff’s substantive 
theory in Boomer was nuisance, based on the factory’s particulates, 
as less tangible invasions than the explicit invasion of trespass.102 
Nuisance is a more complex substantive tort than trespass because 
the court compares the litigants’ uses.103 A court will treat a 
nuisance defendant better and more leniently in both substance 
and remedy than a trespass defendant.104 This leads creative 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to develop interesting trespass-tort 
characterizations that test the borderline between the two torts to 
achieve favorable treatment for their clients.105 
In a decision finding that projecting a critical message onto a 
building wasn’t a trespass, a Nevada court’s “review of trespass 
law in other jurisdictions reveals two lines of cases. Jurisdictions 
that adhere to the traditional rule of trespass hold a trespass only 
occurs ‘where the invasion of land occurs through a physical, 
tangible object.’”106 The decision continued that “[j]urisdictions 
that adhere to the modern theory hold that a trespass may also 
occur when intangible matter, such as particles emanating from a 
manufacturing plant, cause actual and/or substantial damage to 
the res (sic.).”107 Particulate pollution from a defendant’s dust, 
smoke, and gas might fit into either tort.108 
In Oregon in 1960, for example, a court held that a defendant 
who disseminated particulates and gasses with fluorides had 
                                                                                                     
 101. Id. § 52. 
 102. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 
1970). 
 103. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 51. 
 104. See id. at 133.  
 105. See id. at 134. 
 106. Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 15 Local 159 v. 
Great Wash Park, LLC, No. 67453, 2016 WL 4499940, at *2 (Nev. App. Aug. 18, 
2016) (quoting Babb v. Lee Cty. Landfill SC, LLC, 747 S.E.2d 468, 477 (S.C. 
2013)). 
 107. Id. at *2. Judge Tao wrote in a concurring opinion that the two torts 
overlap: “[E]xpanding the tort of trespass to cover such things as light, gas, or 
odors effectively blurs the two torts together and makes them one.” Id. at *7 (Tao, 
J., concurring). 
 108. See id. at *7 (Tao, J., concurring). 
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committed a trespass.109 In 2011, a Minnesota state intermediate 
appellate court found that defendant’s over-sprayed pesticides that 
drifted from its field to an organic farmer’s field were a trespass 
and that an injunction was a possible remedy.110 In 2012, however, 
the state supreme court held that the invasion of defendant’s 
drifting pesticide wasn’t a trespass because the pesticide wasn’t a 
tangible item that invaded plaintiffs’ land and interfered with 
their possession of it.111 But the court said that defendant’s 
invading pesticide could be a nuisance remedied by an injunction 
because it interfered with plaintiffs’ ability to use their land.112 
There are numerous decisions on both sides.113 
B. The Permanent-Temporary Distinction 
Courts classify a defendant’s nuisance or trespass invasion of 
a plaintiff’s land as permanent or temporary.114 This must include 
the important caveat that “[t]he terms ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ 
                                                                                                     
 109. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 797 (1959) (stating that 
a “defendant’s conduct in causing chemical substances to be deposited upon the 
plaintiffs’ land fulfilled all of the requirements under the law of trespass”), cert. 
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960). 
 110. See Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 802 N.W.2d 
383, 392 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 817 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 
2012). 
 111. See Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 
693, 714 (Minn. 2012). 
 112. See id. at 705. The Minnesota litigation may be a harbinger of litigation 
about dicamba, an herbicide for genetically modified soybeans and cotton that 
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estimated 3.6 million acres of soybeans. See Eric Lipton, Crops in 25 States 
Damaged by Unintended Drift of Weed Killer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/business/soybeans-pesticide.html (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (elaborating on the damage done by the weed killer dicamba) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition to farmers and 
farm groups, environmental groups, the federal EPA, pesticide and chemical 
companies, and state and local regulators are concerned about the herbicide. See 
id.  
 113. See Babb v. Lee Cty. Landfill, LLC, 747 S.E.2d 468, 480 (S.C. 2013) 
(finding that physical invasion is required for trespass, not odor); Larry D. 
Schaefer, Annotation, Recovery in Trespass for Injury to Land Caused by Airborne 
Pollutants, 2 A.L.R. 4th 1054 (1980 & Cumulative Supp.) (collecting decisions on 
both sides). 
 114. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 57. 
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are somewhat nebulous in that they have practical meaning only 
in relation to particular fact situations and can change in 
characterization from one set of facts to another.”115  
The permanent-temporary distinction governs four issues: the 
applicable statute of limitations,116 the choice between (or 
combination of) damages and an injunction, the measure of 
damages, and the definition of a cause of action for preclusion.117 
We are primarily concerned here with the plaintiff’s remedies, the 
court’s choice between, or combination of, damages and an 
injunction and with the measure of the plaintiff’s damages. 
If the court classifies the defendant’s invasion of the plaintiff’s 
property as permanent, the landowner’s single cause of action 
accrued and the statute of limitations period commenced to run 
when the defendant’s invasion began or when the plaintiff’s injury 
became apparent.118 If the statute of limitations period has 
expired, the owner’s suit against the defendant’s permanent 
invasion is time-barred.119 
If the plaintiff’s lawsuit against the defendant’s permanent 
invasion isn’t time barred, the landowner has one cause of action 
for past and future damages.120 The court will measure a successful 
plaintiff’s permanent damages by diminution, the value that the 
plaintiff’s property lost because of the defendant’s invasion.121 By 
paying the plaintiff his permanent damages, the defendant 
acquires something like an easement or servitude on the plaintiff’s 
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 120. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 57. 
 121. See Forest, 795 S.E. 2d at 883 n.12. 
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property.122 The defendant, moreover, exercises something like 
eminent domain over the plaintiff’s property.123  
The New York court’s remedy for plaintiff Boomer was, in 
effect, permanent damages. The court’s conditional injunction 
formally enjoined Atlantic Cement’s nuisance, but the court stayed 
its injunction, apparently for eighteen months; the injunction 
would never become effective if defendant paid plaintiff’s damages 
which in turn created an easement.124  
A defendant’s temporary invasion is divided into two 
subdivisions: the defendant’s repeated invasions or its continuing 
invasion of the plaintiff’s property.125 Each day of a defendant’s 
temporary invasion of the plaintiff’s land is a self-contained cause 
of action for statute-of-limitations purposes.126 The owner may sue 
the defendant to recover for his temporary damages that occurred 
during the statute-of-limitations period immediately preceding his 
lawsuit.127 
Instead of damages, the owner’s future remedy for the 
defendant’s continuing trespass is often an injunction that orders 
the defendant to either cease or ameliorate its tort.128 The court 
may couple a future-oriented injunction with awarding the 
plaintiff a rental-value measure of damages for the defendant’s 
past invasions.129 A court is more likely to measure a plaintiff’s 
temporary damages by the cost to restore the land or by the land’s 
rental value than by its diminution in value.130 If the judge doesn’t 
grant the plaintiff an injunction, the plaintiff may, in the future, 
sue the defendant in a second action for his damages that occurred 
after the first judgment.131 This was the trial judge’s decision in 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement that the Court of Appeals reversed.132 
                                                                                                     
 122. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 57. 
 123. See id. at 153. 
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C. Economics and the Environment 
Two of the reasons Professor Halper gave for nuisance’s legal 
and economic complexity are prominent in Boomer: How, first, 
should a court adopt the common law of nuisance to the forces of 
economic development?133 A landowner-plaintiff who relies on the 
traditional torts of nuisance and trespass may be a conservative 
property-rights opponent of industrial progress.134 Second, what 
role does the public interest in a wholesome environment play?135 
The plaintiff may also be a progressive paladin fighting to protect 
the environment. 
The Boomer court’s minimalist opinion emphasized economic 
development and subordinated the larger public issue of 
environmental control: 
A court performs its essential function when it decides the 
rights of parties before it . . . . It is a rare exercise of judicial 
power to use a decision in private litigation as a purposeful 
mechanism to achieve direct public objectives greatly beyond 
the rights and interests presently before the court. 
Effective control of air pollution is a problem presently far from 
solution even with the full public and financial powers of 
government . . . . It seems apparent that the amelioration of air 
pollution will depend on technical research in great depth; on a 
carefully balanced consideration of the economic impact of close 
regulation; and of the actual effect on public health. It is likely 
to require massive public expenditure and to demand more than 
any local community can accomplish and to depend on regional 
and interstate controls. 
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of 
private litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial 
establishment is neither equipped in the limited nature of any 
judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down and 
implement an effective policy for the elimination of air 
pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference of one 
private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and 
should not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a 
                                                                                                     
 133. See Halper, supra note 71, at 91. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 102 (quoting John P.S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the 
Industrial Revolution: Some Lessons from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 
155, 161 (1983)). 
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dispute between property owners and a single cement plant—
one of many—in the Hudson River valley.136  
The court added that the “public health or other public 
agencies” are not foreclosed from “seeking proper relief.”137 These 
authorities have diligently pursued efforts to reduce pollution and 
clean up the air.138 Cement plants continue to be heavily regulated 
industries.139 Private plaintiffs’ nuisance litigation continues 
apace along with the public environmental regulatory law that 
legislatures have developed in the meantime.140 
A counterbalancing decision also from the early years of the 
environmental era was Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders.141 
Defendant appealed from plaintiffs’ judgment in a neighbors’ 
nuisance lawsuit against defendant’s huge automobile shredder.142 
The Court of Appeals was due to reverse the trial judge because 
the judge’s remedy, permanent damages plus a shut-down 
injunction, was duplicative and overreaching.143 
Writing for the United States Court of Appeals, Justice Tom 
Clark dealt with several features of the common-law technique and 
environmental law in ways that contrast with the Boomer court:  
This case is representative of the new breed of lawsuit spawned 
by the growing concern for cleaner air and water. The birth and 
burgeoning growth of environmental litigation have forced the 
courts into difficult situations where modern hybrids of the 
traditional concepts of nuisance law and equity must be 
fashioned. Nuisance has always been a difficult area for the 
courts . . . . E]nvironmental consciousness may be the saving 
prescript for our age. Thus the right of environmentally-
aggrieved parties to obtain redress in the courts serves as a 
necessary and valuable supplement to legislative efforts to 
restore the natural ecology of our cities and countryside. 
                                                                                                     
 136. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970). 
 137. Id. at 873. 
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Judicial involvement in solving environmental problems does, 
however, bring its own hazards. Balancing the interests of a 
modern urban community . . . may be very difficult. Weighing 
the desire for economic and industrial strength against the need 
for clean and livable surroundings is not easily done, especially 
because of the gradations in quality as well as quantity that are 
involved. There is the danger that environmental problems will 
be inadequately treated by the piecemeal methods of litigation. 
It is possible that courtroom battles may be used to slow down 
effective policymaking for the environment. Litigation often 
fails to provide sufficient opportunities for the expert analysis 
and broad perspective that such policymaking often requires. 
 
As difficult as environmental balancing may be, however, some 
forum for aggrieved parties must be made available. If 
necessary, the courts are qualified to perform the task. The 
courts are skilled at “balancing the equities,” a technique that 
traditionally has been one of the judicial functions. Courts are 
insulated from the lobbying that gives strong advantages to 
industrial polluters when they face administrative or legislative 
review of their operations. The local state or federal court, 
because of its proximity to the individual problem, is often in a 
better position to judge the effect of a pollution nuisance upon a 
locality. For all of these reasons, the balancing in this case, 
although difficult, was nonetheless a proper function for the 
court below to perform. All other forums for obtaining relief 
were cut-off from the claimants and they understandably 
turned to the courts for relief.144 
 
I endorse Professor Klass’s unfavorable contrast of the Boomer 
court’s to the Harrison court’s attitudes and approaches to the 
judicial role in applying common-law doctrines to develop a remedy 
for a large environmental problem.145  
Similarly, Professor Farber questioned whether the Boomer 
majority’s “balancing” weighed everything relevant to its 
decision.146 He pointed out that the majority considered the cement 
plant’s investment and its employees, but that it ignored the 
deleterious effect of the factory’s pollution on the health of the 
                                                                                                     
 144. Id. at 1120–21. 
 145. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the 
Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 571–76 (2007); see also Henry E. Smith, 
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1733–34 (2004). 
 146. See Farber, supra note 75, at 20. 
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people in the vicinity.147 The court, he wrote, “refers to one 
third-party interest favoring the defendant—the number of 
employees at the plant—but it ignores the third-party interest 
favoring the plaintiff, the regional impact of the defendant’s air 
pollution.”148 Denying plaintiff Boomer an injunction and remitting 
him to permanent damages downgraded public health.149 Favoring 
awarding Boomer diminution damages over granting him an 
injunction means forcing him, in effect, to exchange his health for 
the defendant’s money.150 Mr. Bill Futrell concluded that the 
Boomer majority incorrectly subordinated the injunction to 
damages and “vitiated the law of private nuisance.”151   
The public interest would have been better served if the 
Boomer court had chosen different remedies.152 The New York 
court under-valued the injunction and overlooked the public health 
and the environment.153 The court should have enjoined, ordering 
the harmful activity modified or stopped.154 Instead of 
compensatory damages, the court, as will be discussed below, 
might have awarded damages for past injury and ordered a 
“standards” injunction that required the cement company to install 
and maintain available pollution-control technology.155  
Laycock, who faults the Boomer court’s “terrible opinion,” 
reached a different conclusion about its result.156 He agreed with 
the court’s choice of a damages remedy.157 The Boomer court, he 
wrote, reached an “entirely predictable result” through historical 
                                                                                                     
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 24. 
 150. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 876 (N.Y. 1970) 
(Jasen, J., dissenting). 
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and analytical error.158 Because of the disparity in values, the 
choice the court saw for itself between a shut-down injunction and 
damages is a close one that may favor damages.159 In my judgment, 
the choice discussed below between a standards injunction and 
damages favors a standards injunction. 
D. The Common Law, Judgment, and Discretion 
The court decides the defendant’s liability first, then whether 
to grant a plaintiff any remedy.160 The court makes two decisions 
about a successful plaintiff’s remedy: (1) it chooses which remedy 
and (2) it measures-defines the chosen remedy.161 An economist 
might state these important decisions as whether a defendant’s 
activity is an externality and, if so, whether and how the defendant 
will internalize its externality.  
The court’s major choice of remedy for a defendant’s pollution 
is between compensatory damages and an injunction.162 After the 
court chooses the plaintiff’s remedy, it decides how to measure or 
define it, the amount of damages and the injunction’s terms.163 The 
court’s discretion in choosing a plaintiff’s remedy is more 
circumscribed than its discretion in measuring-defining it.164 After 
the judge decides to grant the plaintiff an injunction, her discretion 
increases when considering the injunction’s terms.165 
The New York Court of Appeals decided Boomer under the 
court-made common law tort of nuisance.166 A court applying the 
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 159. See id. at 35. 
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common law to a dispute that isn’t controlled by a precedent 
literally creates the law as it consults existing similar decisions to 
decide both the substance and the successful plaintiff’s remedy.167  
Does the judge have discretion to find that a defendant 
violated the plaintiff’s substantive right, to decline to grant the 
plaintiff an injunction, and to substitute money damages for the 
plaintiff’s property right? A negative answer and a minority view 
came from Professors Kraus and Coleman: “It is surely odd to claim 
that an individual’s right is protected when another individual is 
permitted to force a transfer at a price set by third parties. Isn’t 
the very idea of a forced transfer contrary to the autonomy or 
liberty thought constitutive of rights?”168 
Professor Plater articulated the majority approach that 
approves a common-law court’s flexibility in choosing a plaintiff’s 
remedy.169 He wrote that in a non-statutory lawsuit governed by 
court-made common-law rules, the judge may find that the 
defendant violated the substantive rule yet not grant an injunction 
because “abatement was decided anew in each case.”170 “An 
injunction,” the Supreme Court said in 2008, emphasizing Plater’s 
point, “is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from 
success on the merits as a matter of course.”171 The judge has 
discretion to find the defendant liable for a tort, but to decline to 
grant the plaintiff an injunction and instead award him 
damages.172  
In a statutory decision, Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo,173 the 
Supreme Court cited the New York court’s common-law decision in 
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Boomer as well as an Arizona common-law decision174 that this 
Article discusses below to illustrate the judge’s equitable 
discretion.175 Professor Farber wrote in 2005 that “[u]nfortunately, 
the Supreme Court has done little to clarify the availability of 
environmental injunctions in the twenty years since Weinberger, 
so we still cannot be completely certain about the extent to which 
Boomer carries over to statutory injunctions.”176 The common-law 
Boomer court drew on its equitable discretion to deny plaintiff an 
injunction that would forbid an activity that the court conceded is 
improper.177 “Despite its approving citation of Boomer,” Farber 
speculates, “the Weinberger Court probably did not mean to 
endorse open-ended judicial discretion.”178 Because the Supreme 
Court has not revisited equitable discretion since Weinberger, we 
continue to lack a definitive answer.179 
III. Calabresi and Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral 
Since the 1970s, the early days of law-and-economics 
scholarship, economic-analysis scholars have discussed the New 
York court’s choice in Boomer between damages and an injunction 
under the rubric of liability rule versus property rule, the 
vocabulary in the famous Cathedral article.180 Tours of the 
Cathedral are a “cottage industry” in the law reviews.181 These 
discussions occupy a major corner of economic-analysis 
scholarship.182 
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The Cathedral article presented a court like the Boomer court 
with four possible solutions or “Rules.”183 Rule 1 is a “property 
rule.”184 The court finds that a nuisance exists; the plaintiff 
prevails on the defendant’s nuisance.185 Then the court grants the 
plaintiff an injunction closing the defendant’s factory.186 Rule 2 is 
a “liability rule.”187 The court finds that a nuisance exists; the 
plaintiff prevails on the defendant’s nuisance.188 Then the court 
awards the plaintiff the damages that the judge or jury sets.189 
Requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff damages allows the 
defendant’s tortious activity to continue.190 The New York court’s 
Boomer decision for permanent damages is a Rule 2 solution.191 
Rule 3 is a “no-nuisance” rule.192 The court finds that a nuisance 
does not exist.193 The losing plaintiff takes nothing.194 The court 
allows the defendant’s activity to continue unscathed.195 Rule 4 is 
a “plaintiff-pays” rule.196 The court finds that the defendant’s 
nuisance exists.197 It enjoins the defendant’s activity only if, 
however, the plaintiff pays the defendant, perhaps measured by 
the defendant’s cost to comply.198  
This Article turns to applying the Cathedral article’s 
alternatives to Boomer and Atlantic Cement. It will delve into 
normative matters of policy and principle, actual court decisions as 
positive law, and vocabulary. It will qualify and criticize the 
Cathedral article’s analysis because it circumscribes the injunction 
remedy, leads to questionable results, and neither aids analysis 
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nor helps predict the results in many of the core situations it 
purports to cover. This Article will conclude that scholars should 
develop more precise vocabulary and better policy justifications 
which will lead to sounder injunction decisions in actual pollution 
disputes. 
A. The Cathedral Article’s Rule 3 
This Article takes Rule 3 out of order and discusses it first 
before Rules 1 and 2 because it makes more remedies sense to 
examine the threshold liability question, whether a defendant is 
liable or not to a plaintiff under substantive law, before turning to 
the subsequent question of the plaintiff’s remedy. Rule 3 does not 
present the court with a choice of remedy.199 The court finds no 
tort, no substantive liability. 
It may be neither wise nor desirable for a court to restrict or 
prohibit a landowner’s activity merely because it affects another 
person.200 Adjoining landowners may adopt or may have adopted a 
solution to maximize the value of both tracts. Perhaps the 
plaintiff’s house was cheaper or more desirable in the first place 
because of the defendant’s industrial site next door. 
A court could compare or balance the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s interests and find that, where the defendant’s activity 
is useful to the community, no nuisance exists.201 The court will 
consider several questions about land use, enterprise, and the 
environment: What are the proper “costs” or “expenses” of a 
defendant’s enterprise?202 If particulate pollution from the cement 
plant is held to be a homeowner’s cost, will resources be allocated 
efficiently? I think not. In addition to the health and 
environmental hazards, if the price of cement excludes the 
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negative externality, it will be lower than it would be otherwise 
which will lead to over-consumption of cement.203 
“A nuisance may be merely the right thing in the wrong place, 
like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”204 Both whether a 
nuisance exists and its remedy depend on the context and discrete 
situation.205  
We will return to pig pens below, but first, staying in a rural 
landscape, here is the French court of appeals’ response to a 
plaintiff’s complaint about a flock of chickens kept by another 
resident of a rural village: 
[T]he chicken is an ordinary and stupid animal, the truth of the 
matter being that no one, not even a Chinese circus, has ever 
been able to train it; living near a chicken implies a lot of 
silence, some tender clucks and some cackles ranging from 
happiness (laying of an egg) to serenity (tasting a worm) and 
including panic (seeing a fox); this peaceful neighboring has 
never disturbed no one but those who, for wholly different 
reasons, hold a grudge against the owners of the gallinaceans; 
this court shall not rule that the ship bothers the sailor, flour 
disturbs the baker, the violin puts out the orchestra leader and 
a chicken inconveniences an inhabitant of the hamlet of La 
Rochette (402 souls) in the district of Puy-de-Dôme.206 
The New York court may have retreated from Boomer in 
Copart Industries v. Consolidated Edison,207 a similar dispute. 
Copart prepared and stored new automobiles next to Consolidated 
Edison’s (“Con Ed”) generating plant.208 Fly ash containing acid 
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allegedly from the plant marred the finishes on Copart’s new 
cars.209 Copart went out of business.210 Copart sued Con Ed for 
damages.211 The jury found for Con Ed.212 The court of appeals 
affirmed.213 It approved jury instructions that required plaintiff 
Copart to have shown that Con Ed had negligently or intentionally 
harmed Copart.214  
Another New York cement plant, this one a legal, 
nonconforming use, was not, the court held, a nuisance because the 
trial judge had found “the best and most modern 
equipment . . . has eliminated most of the noise, dust and bright 
lights . . . .”215 The dissent argued that the plant was a nuisance 
that the court ought to remedy, as in Boomer, with permanent 
damages.216  
The Idaho court compared the economic utility of the 
defendant’s industrial feedlot with 9,000 “odiferous” cattle and 
found that it outweighed the plaintiff’s olfactory and other harm 
from the defendant’s business.217 No nuisance, the court held, no 
liability.218 “The State of Idaho is sparsely populated and its 
economy depends largely upon the benefits of agriculture, lumber, 
mining and industrial development.”219 The dissent quipped that 
“[i]f humans are such a rare item in this state, maybe there is all 
the more reason to protect them,” at least with damages.220  
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Perhaps the New York and Idaho courts above have rejected 
the flexibility of adjusting damages and injunction remedies and 
retreated to a rigid binary “nuisance”-“no nuisance” analysis. If so, 
this approach may circumscribe courts’ use of nuisance and 
injunctions as methods of environmental amelioration. This may 
be an unsatisfactory way to respond to people affected by 
pollution.221  
The common law is flexible enough for a creative court to mold 
substantive nuisance doctrine and remedies to meet changed 
conditions. “Whatever the legitimacy of the oft-voiced fear of 
judicial activism in other areas, in the environmental field a 
complex of political, legal, and social factors makes judicial 
sensitivity and creativity pivotally important to the way in which 
all of us work, play, eat, sleep, and die.”222  
B. The Cathedral Article’s Rules 1 and 2 
Once the court has found that the defendant is liable under 
the substantive law of nuisance or trespass, it turns to the 
successful plaintiff’s remedy. This Article will next discuss the 
court’s choice between granting the plaintiff an injunction, Rule 1, 
and awarding damages, Rule 2.223 
The Cathedral article defined the vocabulary in Rule 1 as the 
“property rule,” and continued that “an entitlement is protected by 
a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove 
the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary 
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon 
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by the seller.”224 Thus, a property entitlement is impeccable until 
the owner parts with or sells the property voluntarily. The 
property owner’s power to set the property’s value is exclusive.225 
She can refuse any buyer’s offer.226 The property’s price is 
completely within its owner’s control, whim, or discretion.227 
Explaining Rule 2, the “liability rule,” the Cathedral article 
continued that the court may decline to grant the successful 
plaintiff an injunction that forbids the polluting tortfeasor from 
continuing its nuisance.228 The owner may recover damages from 
that defendant.229 If so, the owner must accept the court’s money 
judgment for the property’s “value” as the court determines the 
damages “objectively.”230  
The Cathedral article’s “property rule”-“liability rule” 
vocabulary and definitions have become part of the 
economic-analysis vernacular. Scholars use them to describe the 
nuisance or trespass court’s choice between an injunction and 
damages. This Article returns below to the question of whether the 
vocabulary and definitions describe the actual remedies 
accurately. 
C. Balancing the Hardships, Injunction Versus Damages 
Since the Cathedral article’s first two solutions or rules 
involve the court’s choice of remedies between granting the 
plaintiff an injunction and awarding him damages, this Article will 
treat them together along with the doctrine of balancing the 
hardships, or a close synonym, a crucial mediating principle.231 
Professor Laycock uses the phrase “undue hardship” to launch 
essentially the same inquiry as balancing the hardships.232 As part 
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of its discrete decision whether to grant the successful nuisance or 
trespass plaintiff an injunction, the court compares or balances the 
plaintiff’s hardships without an injunction and the defendant’s 
hardships from one.233 When the defendant’s comparative 
hardship from an injunction is “undue,” the judge declines to grant 
the plaintiff an injunction and defaults to awarding him damages 
instead.234  
Balancing may be disreputable. As Professor Farber observed, 
“[t]he defendant in an injunction proceeding who asks the court to 
balance the remedies in his favor is, in effect, asking the court to 
approve of his decision not to comply with the duties that 
law-abiding citizens comply with voluntarily. Thus, the court is 
being asked to voice its approval of lawless conduct.”235 
In 1948, Professor McClintock evaluated the court’s choice 
between granting the successful plaintiff an injunction and 
awarding him damages, and justified balancing the hardships: 
[P]ractical experience has shown that in the administration of 
specific relief there must be more discretion vested in the judge 
than in the allowance of money damages for the injury suffered. 
In the latter there can never be any greater injury inflicted on 
defendant by allowing recovery than would be inflicted on 
plaintiff by denying it. But it very often happens that the award 
of specific relief would inflict a hardship on the defendant which 
is out of all proportion to the injury its refusal would cause to 
plaintiff. In these cases, by the great weight of authority, equity 
still has discretion in adjusting the relief to be awarded to the 
needs of the fact situation.236 
This Article follows McClintock in accepting the necessity of 
the balancing-the-hardships doctrine.237 It “balances” rather than 
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“compares” the parties’ hardships primarily because balance is the 
more common term. It balances the parties’ “hardships” instead of 
their “equities” because “hardships” is more accurate and because 
it eliminates a confusing definition and usage of “equity.”  
At this point, it is propitious to confess an analytical and 
vocabulary difficulty. The factors the court “balances” are not 
commensurable. Balancing is a metaphor that means comparing 
the parties’ benefits and detriments. The two sides of the “scale” 
don’t contain identical, comparable, or even similar things. 
Balancing, Justice Scalia wrote, “is more like judging whether a 
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”238 
Balancing the hardships, although not a complete analysis, focuses 
the court’s judgment on the critical issues in the decision.  
What would legal life be like without balancing the hardships? 
An example comes from France.239 “Under trespass, even a minor 
encroachment on the neighbor’s land justifies the cessation or 
demolition of offending conduct as the Cour de cassation has noted 
many times, including a case in which a wall overlapped by half a 
centimeter upon the neighbor’s land.”240 Litigation without 
balancing the hardships that leads to termination, destruction, or 
removal would create harsh results for defendants who made 
innocent and minor mistakes.241 
A North Carolina court’s decision in Williams v. South & 
South Rentals242 introduces another possibility. Defendant’s 
“apartment building encroaches approximately one square foot on 
plaintiff’s land.”243 Defendant’s encroachment was apparently 
inadvertent.244 Plaintiff’s tract “has never been used for any 
purpose, is oddly shaped, is located substantially in a creek bed, is 
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practically unusable and consists of one-fourth to one-third of an 
acre.”245 Plaintiff offered to sell his tract to defendant for “a sum in 
excess of $45,000.00.”246  
After settlement negotiations failed, plaintiff sued defendant 
for an injunction.247 The Tarheel State’s intermediate court of 
appeals rejected the doctrine of balancing the hardships.248 It 
concluded that: 
[S]ince the encroachment and continuing trespass have been 
established, and since defendant is not a quasi-public entity, 
plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law to the relief prayed for, 
namely removal of the encroachment. Accordingly, we remand 
this case to the Superior Court for entry of a mandatory 
injunction ordering defendant to remove that part of its 
apartment building that sits upon plaintiff’s land as shown on 
the plat contained in the record.249  
If the court had balanced these parties’ hardships, this 
defendant’s encroachment would probably have qualified for 
permanent damages and, perhaps, an easement.250 Instead, after 
the court of appeals’s decision, defendant purchased the disputed 
portion from plaintiff for several thousand dollars.251 This observer 
concludes that plaintiff may have employed a threat to make the 
injunction effective to create an advantage in negotiating a 
generous cash settlement.  
Balancing the litigants’ hardships and retaining the 
alternative of awarding the plaintiff damages are indispensable to 
fair judicial decisions about whether to grant a trespass or 
nuisance plaintiff an injunction. A judge administering the choice 
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between damages and an injunction needs to have the doctrine 
available to prevent rigor and asperity for a defendant or a possible 
unbalanced settlement.252 
But a Boomer-Rule 2 permanent-damages solution should be 
rare. Decisions awarding a successful plaintiff permanent 
damages instead of an injunction are, Laycock wrote, sometimes 
correct, sometimes based on special features, sometimes reveal a 
preference for money based on superannuated notions of 
irreparable injury, and sometimes quite muddled in their 
analysis.253 
Many economic-analysis scholars support the 
permanent-damages remedy in Boomer. They argue that a court 
should favor awarding a plaintiff damages instead of an injunction 
when the defendant’s cost to comply merely exceeds the plaintiff’s 
benefit; that is when the value or utility of the defendant’s 
nuisance activity is larger than the harm it causes to the 
plaintiff.254 The most extreme pro-damages, anti-injunction 
scholar is Professor Lewin: 
[E]fficiency concerns predominate in the selection of an 
appropriate [nuisance] remedy, with a general presumption 
against unconditional injunctive relief for prevailing plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs generally would be limited to recovering damages, 
with injunctive relief being available only when the defendant’s 
conduct was egregious or when it threatened the safety or 
personal liberty of the plaintiff.255 
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The formulation of Rule 2, which compares values and utilities 
to favor the defendant if its value is merely larger than the 
plaintiff’s, puts too high of a burden on a plaintiff seeking an 
injunction and favors damages over injunctions more than leading 
scholars McClintock, Laycock, Smith, and Farber, as well as 
United States common law.256  
The judge in McClintock’s formulation quoted above should 
grant the plaintiff an injunction unless “[the] hardship on the 
defendant . . . is out of all proportion to the injury its refusal would 
cause [the] plaintiff.”257  
For Laycock, when the defendant’s cost to comply with an 
injunction is “greatly disproportionate” to the plaintiff’s benefit 
from it, the judge may decline to grant the plaintiff an injunction 
and remit him to compensatory damages.258 If an injunction costs 
the defendant quite a lot more than it benefits the plaintiff, then 
the judge may balance the parties’ hardships and award the 
plaintiff damages instead of an injunction.259 The judge, he wrote, 
should grant a nuisance or trespass plaintiff an injunction “except 
when cost is prohibitive” because an injunction will impose 
“hardship [on defendant] greatly disproportionate to the benefits 
it would confer on plaintiff,” that is when “fears of extortionate 
holdouts become great enough to outweigh the value of enforcing 
[plaintiff’s] property rights.”260 
Professor Henry Smith has also challenged the 
economic-analysis approach that favors awarding a nuisance 
plaintiff damages.261 Smith maintains that judges should utilize an 
injunction remedy more frequently than many of the 
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economic-analysis scholars suggest.262 He encourages a judge to 
grant a plaintiff an injunction, particularly when the defendant 
has trespassed, but also for the defendant’s nuisance where the 
defendant’s encroachment on the plaintiff’s property is less 
palpable.263 Smith prefers an injunction to damages because of 
information costs, a court’s measurement of a plaintiff’s damages 
is expensive and imprecise.264 
Farber wrote that the judge should enjoin an egregious 
nuisance like the one in Boomer except “where the balance tilts 
very strongly against the plaintiffs” and an injunction is 
“infeasible . . . . [T]he plaintiff is always prima facie entitled to an 
injunction, but in the case of highly disproportionate harm to the 
defendant or the public, the injunction can be made defeasible or 
conditional by a damage payment.”265  
“Where,” the United States Supreme Court wrote, “substantial 
redress can be afforded by the payment of money and issuance of 
an injunction would subject the defendant to grossly 
disproportionate hardship, equitable relief may be denied although 
the nuisance is indisputable.”266  
Later New York decisions bear out McClintock, Laycock, 
Smith, Farber, and the Supreme Court. These decisions show that 
the New York courts are reluctant to employ Boomer’s nuisance 
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remedy of no injunction but permanent damages and a servitude. 
Instead the Empire State’s courts have given several reasons to 
grant nuisance plaintiffs injunctions. An asphalt plant that was a 
public nuisance was shuttered without comparing economic 
consequences.267 Because another defendant’s racetrack was also a 
public nuisance, Boomer-balancing was inapplicable.268 A third 
court enjoined the nuisance because the defendant’s activity 
violated a pollution permit.269 A New York court also enjoined 
because less than a “vast” economic disparity existed between the 
plaintiff and the defendant.270 A final court enjoined the 
defendant’s activity because it also violated the zoning 
ordinance.271  
Other states’ courts’ Rule 2 decisions, which find a nuisance, 
refuse an injunction and award damages, are not clear-cut. 
Research is difficult. Courts, which often rely on decisions from 
their jurisdiction, may not cite out-of-state decisions. Their 
decisions raise numerous factors and points. The courts’ 
terminology varies. The courts’ discussions of injunctions are often 
brief. I have tried to stay with similar nuisance decisions. 
In Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown,272 the trial judge had 
granted the plaintiff an injunction that protected him from the 
city’s pipe that leaked human sewage.273 The Illinois Appellate 
Court rejected plaintiff’s bad argument that defendant’s nuisance 
triggers an injunction without comparative hardships.274 It held 
that, for now, temporary damages would be adequate.275 The court 
thought, however, that the sewage leak should stop, that the 
defendant should repair or remove the pipe, and, in short, that the 
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nuisance should be abated.276 Thus plaintiff could sue again if and 
when the offending sewage pipe leaked.277  
In Weinhold v. Wolff,278 the Iowa court dealt with defendant’s 
large-scale hog-feeding operation under the Hawkeye State’s 
right-to-farm statute, a rural tort reform that attenuates a private 
plaintiff’s nuisance litigation and remedies.279 Citing the 
importance of pork to the state economy, the court said that 
diminution in value plus special damages would be an adequate 
remedy for the plaintiff and that closing the defendant’s feedlot 
would be contrary to the right-to-farm statute.280 The court later 
struck that statute down.281  
In the Alabama court’s Baldwin v. McClendon,282 the court 
cited the “comparative-injury” doctrine in refusing an injunction 
that would “bring a severe blow” to defendants.283 The court’s 
remedy was a conditional injunction that would shut defendant’s 
hog feeding operation down if defendant didn’t pay plaintiff $3,000 
permanent damages.284 Because the trial judge had visited 
defendant’s operation, the Supreme Court emphasized his 
equitable discretion.285  
Feed-lot defenders have responded to critics’ turned-up noses 
at farmers’ feedlots by invoking “the smell of money.” In short, 
rural pigs are the social and economic equivalent of chickens in the 
French village above.286 Since then, the dramatic trend to 
industrial feedlots with thousands of animals has created a 
difference in kind, not one of degree. In addition to polluting 
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streams and rivers, these titanic feedlots offend at least four of the 
five senses and lower both property value and quality of life.287 
Distance and the wind are the only antidotes to their odor. Their 
public health effects include “antibiotic resistance and disease, 
epidemic and pandemic influenza, and asthma and airway 
obstruction.”288 
Reading appellate reports sometimes leads me to turn up my 
nose again, this time because of my idea that, in aid of defendants’ 
economic activity, some courts ignore the feedlot proprietors’ 
failures to provide sufficient buffer zones. If a court neither 
shutters a defendant’s feedlot nor regulates its operation—that is 
if it relegates its neighbor to damages—then the better measure of 
damages is a buy-out or moving-expenses measure. Even in 
Alabama in 1974, $3,000 in diminution damages seems stingy; 
indeed, I think, woefully deficient. The Iowa court had added 
special damages to permanent diminution damages; plaintiffs’ 
temporary damages were rent-based and included their 
discomfort.289 The Iowa court’s less parsimonious diminution plus 
special damages, might, if defendant forced the family to abandon 
their home, let them build or buy a replacement.  
Another feedlot under an Idaho right-to-farm statute led the 
court to refuse a shut-down injunction but to approve a conditions 
injunction that capped the number of animals and limited the type 
of feed but didn’t award damages.290 A huge feeding operation in 
Nebraska ended with the feedlot enjoined “from producing 
offensive odors,” failing that of a shutdown order.291 A Rhode 
Island municipality was given time to relocate its sewage pumping 
station; the court coupled this future injunction with damages 
until relocation.292 Under the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance, the 
Alabama court affirmed a “don’t-build-it” injunction after the trial 
                                                                                                     
 287. See Smart, supra note 281, at 2107.  
 288. James Merchant & David Osterberg, Iowa View: DNR Scoring System 
for Hog Farms Fails to Protect Our Health, DES MOINES REGISTER, Sept. 11, 2017, 
at 9A. 
 289. See Weinhold v. Wolff, 555 N.W. 2d 454, 465–66 (Iowa 1996); see also 
Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Estate of Forrister, 774 S.E. 2d 755, 770 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2015); Babb v. Lee Cty. Landfill SC, LLC, 747 S.E. 2d 468, 481 (S.C. 2013). 
 290. See Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Idaho 1995). 
 291. Goeke v. Nat’l Farms, 512 N.W. 2d 626, 629, 632 (Neb. 1994). 
 292. See Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321, 329 (R.I. 1995). 
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judge’s personal inspection.293 A student note writer in Iowa 
recommended the anticipatory-nuisance doctrine because, if a 
plaintiff sues before the defendant’s project begins, that deprives 
the proprietor of its investments’ economic weight in the 
balance.294 
State appellate courts’ decisions granting the plaintiffs’ 
injunctions are, like the New York decisions, nuanced and 
multi-factored. Many appear to be based on inadequate buffer 
zones. In the long run, a court might be careful about extending 
the buffer zone because “self pollution,” although harmful, isn’t a 
tort.295  
On the most general level, a court may decline to grant a 
plaintiff an expensive and perhaps wasteful remedy. For courts, 
the parties’ rights under the positive law determine the results 
more than the economic-analysis view that the party whose use is 
more valuable should prevail.296 The courts’ analysis is perforce 
broader and considers more factors than economic utility. It 
includes environmental values like health, protecting a species, 
water, or air.297 The defendant’s state of mind affects a court’s 
decision. Both courts and economists reprobate defendants’ 
take-now-pay-later tactics because of the destabilizing effect they 
have on property rights.298 
Establishing and maintaining an industrial nuisance is 
intentional, but developing a business is not what we think of when 
we think of an intentional tort. Although a court should refuse to 
balance or compare to favor an intentional tortfeasor, future 
defendants build cement plants, feedlots, and racetracks on 
purpose.299 
                                                                                                     
 293. See Parker v. Ashford, 661 So. 2d 213, 215 (Ala. 1995). 
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 296. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 23. 
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 298. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 201, at 536. 
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The courts’ analysis differs from classical economic analysis. 
The courts’ vocabulary is imprecise and considers multiple factors. 
Witness the differing vocabulary, Laycock’s “undue hardship”300 
and my “balancing the hardships,”301 for similar comparisons.  
Nor is it clear whether the impetus to balance the hardships 
comes from the plaintiffs’ side as an element of their prima facie 
case or if it is an affirmative defense for the defendant to interpose. 
The Torts Restatement’s “factors” for granting a plaintiff an 
injunction lump together the plaintiff’s case for an injunction and 
the defendant’s affirmative defenses.302 In eBay v. MercExchange, 
L.C.C., the Supreme Court stated a standard for a permanent 
injunction that includes the plaintiff’s burden of proof to balance 
the hardships in his favor.303 I have maintained elsewhere that 
affirmative-defense status for balancing the hardships makes 
more sense.304 Laycock says several times that what he names 
undue hardship is a defense.305 However stated and located, we 
agree that courts usually apply the doctrine “in plausible ways.”306  
The Cathedral article, in what Laycock calls a “quite different 
and rather stylized account of the law,”307 doesn’t mention 
                                                                                                     
Barnett, 354 S.W.2d 873, 878 (Mo. 1962); Papanikolas Bros. Entrs. v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1975); see also DOBBS & 
ROBERTS, supra note 201, at 534; Laycock, supra note 61, at n.8. An intentional 
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of restitution and balancing the hardships. See Stuttgart Elec. Co. v. Riceland 
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OF LAW 70 (9th ed. 2014). 
 300. Supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 301. Supra Part III.C and accompanying text. 
 302. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 (AM. LAW INST 1979). 
 303. See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 304. RENDLEMAN, supra note 77, at 86 (arguing that the Court in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.C.C., would have “been better advised to classify [balancing the 
hardships] as [an] affirmative defense[] with the burden on the defendant”). 
 305. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 61, at 1. 
 306. Id. at 19. 
 307. Id. at 20. 
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balancing the hardships-undue hardship. Laycock maintains that 
both the Boomer court and economic-analysis scholars 
under-utilize the doctrine of undue hardship.308 The reason for 
their omission is difficult to grasp. If a court balances the 
hardships in the defendant’s favor, declines to enjoin, and awards 
the plaintiff damages instead of an injunction, that court has, in 
the Cathedral article’s vocabulary, converted the plaintiff’s 
property-rule interest into his liability-rule interest. This advances 
the Cathedral article’s and the Boomer court’s goal.  
The modest suggestions above will clear the air in both the 
literal and the metaphorical sense by encouraging more and more 
detailed injunctions. An overemphasized law-and-economics 
approach circumscribes common law evolution, for example, to 
deal with climate change.309 If injunctions reduce particulate and 
other pollution, our environment will improve and the rate of 
climate change leading to global warming may be reduced. 
D. The Cathedral Article’s Vocabulary of Property Rights and 
Liability Rights 
In addition to disfavoring the injunction remedy in ways that 
undervalue plaintiffs with environmental interests, the Cathedral 
article’s Rules 1 and 2 introduce confusing vocabulary deficiencies. 
The Cathedral article called granting the plaintiff an injunction 
Rule 1, a “property rule” and the second, Rule 2, awarding the 
plaintiff damages, a “liability rule.”310 I disagree below with the 
property rule–liability rule vocabulary of the first two parts of the 
Cathedral article’s choices; that being the court’s choice between 
an injunction and damages.  
In the Cathedral article’s lexicon, the words “property” and 
“liability” don’t have the usual torts, property, and remedies 
meanings of property and liability. These usual meanings follow. 
                                                                                                     
 308. See id. at 19. 
 309. See Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 876 
(2013). 
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1. Property 
A person’s property is her substantive interest.311 The owner 
of the house and lot on Highland Road has a property interest in 
her land. If a future defendant commits a repeated or continuing 
trespass, the court will grant her an injunction that forbids the 
defendant’s future trespasses.312 If a second defendant’s pickup 
truck jumps the curb and destroys her gazebo, the court will award 
her damages measured by diminution or cost-to-repair.313 If a third 
defendant trespasses on plaintiff’s land repeatedly to fish in her 
stream, the court will award her damages for her past harm plus 
an injunction that forbids defendant’s future invasions.314  
The usual meaning of the words property and liability 
distinguishes the defendant’s substantive liability from the 
plaintiff’s remedy, as between Rule 3 and Rules 1 and 2. The 
landowner has a property interest in all three examples in the 
paragraph above. Liability means that the defendant is 
responsible for injuring the plaintiff’s substantive interest, which 
the court will protect with a remedy, damages or an injunction 
above.  
The defendant is subject to liability for his tort in all three 
examples. The court will find that the defendant is liable in tort for 
each trespass on the plaintiff’s property before moving to her 
remedy. But in the Cathedral article’s usage, the second 
defendant’s tort transmogrified the plaintiff’s “property” interest 
in preventing a future tort into a “liability” interest in recovering 
damages. Calling the first example a property rule and the second 
a liability rule changes the usual meaning of the words property 
and liability.315 
                                                                                                     
 311. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 24.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 312. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 799 (1824).  
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2. Liability 
The Cathedral article names its second, or Rule 2, solution a 
“liability rule.”316 The defendant’s trespass or nuisance activity 
invades the plaintiff’s property interest, but the defendant pays 
the plaintiff money damages set by the court.317 “Liability” used 
this way is inaccurate Remedies terminology to analyze a 
plaintiff’s remedies because the court always holds that the 
defendant is liable to the plaintiff under substantive law before 
turning to the plaintiff’s remedy.  
After the court establishes that the defendant is liable to the 
plaintiff, one remedy for the defendant’s nuisance or trespass is an 
injunction, another is damages, a third is restitution.318 In addition 
to being inaccurate, “property rule” and “liability rule” are 
imprecise, too abstract, and too general. “Injunction remedy” and 
“damages remedy” are more accurate and descriptive names than 
“property rule” and “liability rule.”319 Because the analysis omits 
restitution, an important money remedy that will be discussed 
below, a more precise vocabulary would use “damages” in the 
vernacular sense of all money remedies and break “damages” down 
into “compensatory damages,” “punitive damages,” and 
“restitution.”  
“Property rule” and “liability rule” combine the court’s first 
step, the defendant’s threshold substantive liability for its tort, 
with the court’s second step, the remedy the court will employ on 
behalf of the plaintiff. By calling the solutions “rules,” the 
“property rule”–“liability rule” distinction assimilates the court’s 
remedy or solution into substantive law rather than keeping it in 
the separate realm of remedies. Again, professional understanding 
would be better served with the more precise remedies terms 
“injunction” and “damages.” 
The Cathedral article’s reason to name the plaintiff’s 
injunction remedy a “property” rule is that, after the judge grants 
the plaintiff an injunction, the plaintiff can set the price that the 
                                                                                                     
 316. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092. 
 317. See id. at 1105–06. 
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defendant must pay to continue its activity.320 The idea is that a 
plaintiff’s injunction protects and values her property like, my 
metaphor, an impenetrable stone wall that prevents any 
encroachment without the owner’s consent. “When an injunction 
issues,” the Harvard Law Review opined, “the possible severity of 
the penalty for disobedience renders the defendant’s freedom of 
choice virtually nonexistent.”321 
The Cathedral article’s reason is based on the view that an 
injunction is inviolable and self-enforcing.322 But this view is an 
incorrect statement about an injunction as a remedy in actual 
disputes.323 Many real-life defendants violate their real-life 
plaintiffs’ real-life injunctions.324 A more accurate metaphor is that 
an injunction resembles a stop sign with the defendant’s name on 
it more than it resembles an immovable stone wall; “[A]n 
injunction stops conduct only as well as a stop sign stops a car; the 
defendant must apply the brakes and obey.”325 For an injunction to 
work, the defendant must obey it.  
If an errant motorist drives over the curb and wrecks an 
owner’s gazebo, a court will find him liable under negligence law; 
as a remedy, the court will tell him to pay the owner money 
damages. If a trespass—or nuisance—injunction defendant 
violates or “drives through” an injunction-sign and injures the 
plaintiff or her property, the court will tell it to pay its victim 
money for compensatory contempt.326  
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A court will measure the plaintiff’s compensatory-contempt 
money recovery by the plaintiff’s loss from the defendant’s 
violation of the injunction. Awarding the injunction plaintiff 
post-violation compensatory contempt converts the plaintiff’s 
injunction-right from being entitled to the defendant’s obedience 
into a damages-right to recover money from the defendant. 
Compensatory contempt reduces the plaintiff’s remedy from the 
defendant’s conduct to the defendant’s cash.327 “The defendant’s 
violation of [the] injunction convert[ed] the plaintiff from a person 
with rights entitled to be enjoyed in fact to a person with a claim” 
to recover money for compensatory contempt to redress his past 
harm.328  
If the Cathedral article’s “property rule” leads to an injunction 
remedy and a “liability rule” leads to a money damages remedy, an 
enjoined defendant can transmogrify the plaintiff’s right. “The 
defendant can violate an injunction and convert the plaintiff’s 
irreparable right into a cause of action for compensatory contempt, 
money. By breach, the defendant has remitted the plaintiff to that 
inadequate remedy, for it is now too late for [the] plaintiff to enjoy 
the substantive right.”329  
The judge has more contempt options than compensatory 
contempt. An injunction defendant may also be charged with 
coercive contempt or criminal contempt.330 The judge may also 
impose coercive contempt, a staged fine or confinement, pending 
the defendant’s future obedience; coercive contempt will structure 
the defendant’s incentive to comply in the future.331 Criminal 
contempt punishment is the third option.332 But for many 
violations, the plaintiff’s remedy will be compensatory contempt.333 
If experience from structural injunctions against government 
defendants carries over to environmental injunctions, unless there 
are several iterations of disobedience, coercive contempt and 
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criminal contempt are unlikely to be severe in complex litigation 
with an established business defendant.334 
Professor John Golden also refutes the Cathedral article’s 
vocabulary that property rule and liability rule are hermetic closed 
categories.335 Golden’s analysis is similar to mine, although his 
metaphor differs. Because a defendant’s violation converts an 
injunction into money, an injunction, he has written, isn’t an “off 
switch.”336 He criticizes other observers’ dichotomy between 
damages and injunction as “misleading.”337 Because there is no 
criminal contempt to speak of for defendants’ violations of patent 
injunctions, realistically an injunction threatens compensatory 
contempt for violation.338 This, Golden maintains, is insufficient 
deterrence.339 Back to metaphors, since an injunction is not an “off 
switch,” (in my metaphor a stone wall), “an injunction operates 
essentially as a mere gateway to compensatory contempt’s 
higher-than-normal monetary sanctions delivered with 
higher-than-normal speed.”340  
Scholars who understand its vocabulary but recognize its 
analytical shortcomings have cracked the Cathedral walls.341 In 
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his piece about the gulf between remedies and law and economics 
in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Professor Sam Bray 
maintained that scholars of remedies generally ignored the 
“featherweight” Cathedral article which has had “little influence” 
in remedies.342 Remedies scholars’ perspectives and goals differ 
from law-and-economics scholars’: remedies scholars emphasize 
plaintiffs’ compensation, economics scholars favor reducing costs 
and deterrence of future defendants’ breaches.343  
The Cathedral article, Bray showed, got the injunction 
backwards. The injunction, contrary to the Cathedral article, is not 
exclusive, not automatic, and not tied tightly to the plaintiff’s 
substantive entitlement. The judge has more discretion to choose 
and shape an injunction. A judge will favor an injunction when 
market valuation is difficult, not when it is easy. An injunction 
requires more, not less, judicial involvement. An injunction is not 
difficult to dissolve or amend.344  
So far, this Article has parted with the Cathedral article on 
several grounds. It leads the court to under-value an injunction. 
The Cathedral article downgrades protecting the public health and 
the environment, which are better protected by ordering the 
harmful activity modified or stopped instead of awarding money 
damages. Its analysis is out of order, placing the plaintiff’s remedy 
ahead of the defendant’s liability. It leads to analysis that favors 
damages over an injunction in many lawsuits where an injunction 
would be a superior remedy. Its vocabulary is abstract and 
confusing. It oversimplifies and doesn’t understand the injunction 
as a remedy administered by courts.  
One point a skeptic might make is that the foregoing critique 
is irrelevant and beside the point because the law-and-economics 
property-right, liability-right vocabulary exists only where 
professors talk exclusively to other professors and to law students; 
but it hasn’t found its way into lawyers’ and courts’ traditional 
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doctrinal vernacular where actual decisions occur.345 The response 
is that professors use property-right, liability-right vocabulary to 
express a narrow and parsimonious view of the injunction, the 
most effective remedy. Graduates may leave the vocabulary at the 
law school but take the circumscribed injunction into practice. Law 
reform may start in law school classrooms and faculty lounges.   
E. Post-Injunction Negotiation and Hold Outs 
Many economic-analysis writers who argue in favor of 
awarding a nuisance plaintiff damages emphasize transaction 
costs.346 The first risk is that the plaintiff will actually enforce the 
injunction. The Cour de cassation’s rigid destruction remedy for a 
defendant’s encroachment illustrates this potential risk.347 In an 
industrial nuisance, the risk is that the defendant’s operation will 
be shut down.  
The second risk is that the parties’ post-injunction negotiation 
will lead to an unbalanced settlement like the one above in 
Williams v. South & South.348 This Article speculated that those 
parties’ post-injunction negotiation may have ended with a large 
cash settlement.349  
The Boomer court’s majority opinion feared that plaintiff and 
defendant might negotiate leading the defendant polluter to 
override the injunction by purchasing the right to continue: “The 
parties could settle this private litigation at any time if defendant 
paid enough money and the imminent threat of closing the plant 
would build up the pressure on defendant.”350  
The Coase theorem supports parties’ post-injunction 
negotiation; it maintains that, without transaction costs, people 
will exchange and trade and that resources will end up owned by 
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the person who values them the most.351 The parties’ negotiations 
after an injunction are a foundation of many economists’ analysis 
of nuisance remedies. If the court grants a successful plaintiff an 
injunction that benefits him less than it will cost the losing 
defendant to comply, the defendant will, they predict, negotiate 
with the plaintiff to settle the injunction.352  
The rational-choice idea that people uniformly make decisions 
to maximize their economic self-interest convinces many 
economic-analysis scholars that the Boomer plaintiffs were likely 
to relinquish their rights under an injunction for more than their 
loss but less than Atlantic Cement’s $45,000,000 investment. The 
plaintiffs would employ a shut-down injunction as a bargaining 
threat to leverage an “excessive,” money settlement; some 
observers even borrow the criminal law’s adjective to say an 
“extortionate” settlement.353   
If, as they assume, the property owner’s interest is really 
money, then, the scholars maintain, the court ought to limit him 
to recovering damages set in court by a judge or jury instead of 
allowing him to use the injunction as leverage to extract a 
“windfall” settlement from the cement company.354 
The economic-analysis scenario becomes even more grim in its 
third act. Each of several nuisance-tort victims has an incentive 
not to settle until after the others have, then to become a “holdout” 
and raise the defendant’s price even more. A victim’s delay in 
coming to terms with the defendant will facilitate his ability to 
become, in effect, a nuisance troll and to exact an even larger toll 
from the defendant. In many conflicting use situations, where a 
defendant does a little harm to each of a lot of people, it will be 
difficult and expensive for the court to locate all affected people 
and to calculate and distribute their damages.  
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1916 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1859 (2018) 
Some economic-analysis commentators employ a variation 
that favors the nuisance plaintiff’s right to use and enjoy his 
property a little more. They favor granting the plaintiff an 
injunction but only where the defendant’s negotiations with a few 
plaintiffs are feasible because of low transaction costs. 
In conflicting-use situations in which transaction costs are low, 
[because of only one or few plaintiffs] . . . injunctive relief 
should normally be allowed as a matter of course . . . But when 
transaction costs are high, [because of the plethora of 
plaintiffs] . . . the allocation of resources to their most valuable 
uses is facilitated by denying an injunction and instead 
remitting the plaintiff to damages equal to the cost to him of the 
violation of his rights, thus enabling the violation to continue if 
it is worth more to the violator than it costs to the victim.355 
A bilateral monopoly of two persons with no other market 
alternatives combined with a large disparity in values or benefits 
may lead negotiations to break down if each person claims a large 
share of the difference. Economists also consider this breakdown 
to be a transaction cost.356  
How valid is the extensive literature that emphasizes 
court-set damages, a “liability” rule, over an injunction, a 
“property” rule? How persuasive is the argument that 
subordinates an injunction to damages because of the fear that 
injunction plaintiffs will coerce an unbalanced settlement?  
Other scholars register doubts about the Boomer court’s 
money-damages remedy and the economic-analysis arguments 
that support it. What behavioral economists have named the 
“endowment effect” teaches us that its owner values property 
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higher than the market does.357 A court that refuses to grant a 
plaintiff an injunction to exclude a trespasser or to stop a polluter 
is ignoring this subjective aspect of the landowner-plaintiff’s 
interest.358 A judge, Professor Henry Smith wrote, enjoins a 
defendant not to engage in cost-benefit analysis, but to vindicate 
the landowner’s previously existing right to use and exclude.359 The 
economic-analysis scholars and the Boomer court’s fear that a 
homeowner may use an injunction to extract an excessive 
settlement downgrades or ignores that subjective aspect.  
Awarding a nuisance or trespass plaintiff damages instead of 
an injunction may undermine the traditional legal principles that 
an owner’s real property is unique and that money damages are an 
inadequate remedy to protect that property.360 Robust property 
rights require effective remedies. “From at least the early 19th 
century,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, concurring in eBay v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.,361  
courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of 
infringement in the vast majority of patent cases. This ‘long 
tradition of equity practice’ is not surprising, given the difficulty 
of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that 
allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee’s 
wishes . . . .362  
A money award communicates to an owner that his “unique” 
interest, protected by a right to exclude, is merely economic, 
readily converted to currency. As the dissenting opinion charges, 
the court in Boomer, in effect, allowed the cement company to 
continue its tort and to buy a license to pollute.363 It also, in effect, 
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granted eminent domain power to a private interest.364 The court’s 
majority favored the defendant’s commercial development even 
when that development exacted a toll on residents and property 
owners.365 
Yes, but what about the plaintiff who uses an injunction to 
leverage an excessive settlement?  
To begin with, a plaintiff may not have an opportunity to 
negotiate a settlement because the defendant will appeal rather 
than negotiate.366  
Also, a generous settlement may not be that undesirable. If 
the judge grants a successful landowner plaintiff an injunction, 
that injunction implements the endowment effect and allows the 
plaintiff to negotiate with the defendant from a position of strength 
that recognizes the endowment effect and the unique quality of the 
plaintiff’s property interests.367 If a judge cannot consider the full 
subjective value of a landowner’s sentiment, attachment, 
discomfort, and annoyance in setting damages, then granting the 
owner an injunction will be a better way to assure the plaintiff’s 
full compensation.368  
Will, however, a landowner-plaintiff employ an injunction to 
punish the defendant or to achieve over-compensation? There is 
another way to frame this issue: is the risk of a plaintiff either 
closing a defendant’s valuable enterprise or leveraging an 
excessive money settlement a sufficient reason to deny the plaintiff 
an injunction which risks judicial under-compensation? Laycock 
favors awarding the plaintiff damages “when the transaction costs 
of such renegotiation would be high.”369  
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Taking a different and perhaps more salutary approach, Mr. 
Barton Thompson, as he was in 1975, maintained in his Stanford 
Law Review Note that, instead of assuming an excessive coerced 
settlement, the judge could prevent plaintiffs’ over-compensation 
by supervising negotiations and approving settlements.370 
Moreover, he maintained that courts should expand equitable 
estoppel and laches to bar a plaintiff who either led defendant on 
or who waited too long to sue.371  
Justice Charles Fried, as he was then, wrote an opinion in 
Goulding v. Cook372 for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
(SJC) that, with context, provides a helpful way to examine the 
litigants’ post-injunction negotiation and other remedies issues.  
To resolve a dispute with the Cooks about a 3,000 square-foot 
triangle of land in a residential neighborhood where the Cooks 
were preparing to sink a septic tank, the Gouldings sought a 
declaration of ownership and an anti-trespass injunction.373 After 
the trial judge denied the plaintiff Gouldings’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction, the defendant Cooks buried their septic 
tank under the disputed triangle.374  
At the later plenary hearing, however, the trial judge held that 
the Gouldings owned the land.375 But, apparently acceding to the 
Cooks’ fait accompli, the “improvement,” the lower courts granted 
the Cooks an easement for their tank, its price to be set by the 
parties’ negotiation, failing their agreement, apparently, by the 
judge.376  
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The SJC reversed.377 Justice Fried’s opinion begrudgingly 
recognized balancing the hardships, but rejected its application. 
The Cooks must remove the septic tank and pay the Gouldings 
damages.378 “[T]he concept of private property represents a moral 
and political commitment that a pervasive disposition to balance 
away would utterly destroy.”379 Rejecting the Cooks’ invitation to 
balance the hardships, the court refused to “obliterate [property 
rights] in favor of a general power of equitable adjustment and 
enforced good neighborliness.”380  
 The SJC refuted the lower courts’ reasoning about the Cooks’ 
“good faith,” the Gouldings’ lack of harm, and the trial judge’s 
equitable discretion.381 The Cooks undertook the excavation 
project aware that the Gouldings’ lawsuit was still pending.382 An 
underground septic tank isn’t always invisible and harmless. And 
the trial judge lacked equitable discretion to act on an error of 
law.383  
Justice Fried was aware that the parties’ negotiation had 
preceded the lawsuit.384 The lower courts had balanced the 
hardships in the Cooks’ favor. But, although they declined to order 
the Cooks’ septic tank on the Gouldings’ property exhumed, the 
lower courts had recognized the Gouldings’ property interest in the 
triangle by requiring the Cooks to pay for the septic-tank easement 
through what appeared to be supervised negotiation. The 
Gouldings could not, under their view, exploit a mandatory 
injunction to negotiate an unbalanced settlement.385  
The SJC’s mandatory order based on the Gouldings’ property 
right left them in a powerful monopoly position to vindicate or to 
be “compensated” for their property interest.  
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The order created three apparent risks. First, that the 
litigants’ mutual antipathy would prevent a value-maximizing 
solution. Second, that the Gouldings would exploit their monopoly 
to extract an excessive and over-compensatory settlement. Third, 
that the Gouldings would exploit their mandatory injunction to 
deprive the Cooks of a workable sewage system and indeed of the 
ability to utilize their property as a residence. What unfolded? 
A phone conversation with the Gouldings’ lawyer, Mr. John 
Wyman, answered some of my questions.386 In June of 2012, the 
Gouldings still lived next-door to the Cooks. The Gouldings and the 
Cooks were, however, “unfriendly.”387 What about the Cooks’ septic 
tank under the Gouldings’ land? Neither a buyout nor exhumation 
had occurred.388 When the SJC decided for the Gouldings in 1996, 
a sewer line was expected in their costal town. The Cooks planned 
to hook up and abandon the septic tank. The Gouldings, it turned 
out, rested on their victory in principle; they didn’t take advantage 
of their injunction to force the issue. The sewer-line was slow, more 
than a decade, in coming. The Cooks’ septic tank was in use in the 
Gouldings’ land until “recently” when the sewer line finally came 
to the vicinity.389 Property-lawyer John Wyman’s general 
observation that neighbor versus neighbor litigation leads to 
“awful acrimony” and “no compromise”390 bears out Professor 
Farnsworth’s points below about nuisance litigants. 
The rational-choice theory that supports the likelihood of 
parties’ post-injunction negotiation and settlement founders in the 
face of many actual nuisance litigants’ behavior observed in two 
scholars’ studies. Professor, as he was then, now Dean, Ward 
Farnsworth located twenty appealed nuisance lawsuits and asked 
the lawyers whether the parties had negotiated a settlement after 
an appellate decision.391 None had.392 The litigants, Farnsworth 
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learned, just didn’t bargain.393 Because the parties’ mutual enmity 
grew and hardened during protracted litigation, Farnsworth 
concluded that the opponents simply did not negotiate after their 
respective courts decided.394 For an actual human being litigant, 
the acrimony of a protracted dispute militates against any 
discussion, amicable or otherwise, afterwards.395 Coase’s 
bargaining never occurred. Professor Thaler took Farnsworth’s 
study to its logical conclusion: that it refutes the Coase theorem.396 
Professor Maurice Van Hecke had earlier examined actual 
litigation to learn whether mandatory injunctions against 
defendants’ encroachments on plaintiffs’ property were effective 
and whether the injunctions had led to “extortionate” 
settlements.397 His conclusions were similar to Farnsworth’s later 
study of the parties’ post-injunction negotiation after nuisance 
injunctions. Van Hecke contacted forty-four lawyers in 
twenty-nine lawsuits and received replies from thirty-one lawyers 
concerning twenty-five injunctions.398 He concluded that 
seventy-five percent of the injunctions were effective and that little 
evidence existed that the injunctions had been used to coerce 
settlements.399 Attorneys who participated in “extortionate” 
settlements might not, however, have responded to the professor’s 
survey. 
In an email to the author, Professor John Golden suggested a 
“likely” argument: the judge should not grant an injunction “when 
the likelihood of later negotiation is very small (i.e., when 
transaction costs can be understood to be very large—perhaps in 
these cases because the relevant parties simply cannot bear to deal 
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with one another)?”400 Courts exist to resolve bitter disputes that 
the parties cannot. In a civilized society, the court cannot let the 
lawbreaker’s enmity and obduracy, even mutual enmity, hold the 
plaintiff’s rights prisoner.  
Laycock commented that “small-scale studies cast doubt on 
[the] assumption [of the parties’ post-injunction negotiation].”401 I 
invite empirical study, though designing an experiment to study 
prolonged and bitter interpersonal conflict in the real or 
experimental world will be, to say the least, difficult. One 
approach, game theory, is based on rational adversaries, which 
many disputants are not.402 
The economic-analysis picture of nuisance builds on the 
parties’ post-injunction negotiation that may not happen in real 
life. In other words, it is based on an over-simplified theory-based 
view of human nature that exaggerates litigants’ “rational” 
economic behavior and decision-making based on economic 
motives of self-interest and de-emphasizes real litigants’ emotional 
and cultural responses to actual conflict.403 
Humans are quirky and unpredictable critters often blown off 
a rational course by emotional whims and crosscurrents. A court 
deciding whether to grant a nuisance or trespass plaintiff an 
injunction or to award damages should de-emphasize, sometimes 
ignore, the scholars’ rational-choice theory that the parties’ 
self-interest will lead them to post-injunction negotiation. There 
should be no presumption, no blanket rule, about negotiation. 
Many “more mundane” nuisance lawsuits like neighborhood 
conflicts “display claims in which feelings and a sense of right and 
wrong predominate over economic concerns . . . . The time has not 
yet arrived when the idiosyncratic, emotional side of the law can 
be ignored . . . .”404 The judge should decide whether to predict 
negotiation anew in the factual context of each discrete dispute.  
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Post-injunction negotiation between opponents in commercial 
litigation, patent disputes for example, seems more likely. 
Although some patent litigation is between “strangers,” most 
serious patent disputes start with negotiation for a license and, if 
parley founders, proceed to a cease-and-desist or demand letter 
before suit is filed.405 Since the parties are usually business entities 
that have been negotiating all along, no-one should be too 
surprised to learn that negotiation continues after preliminary 
injunctions, permanent injunctions, and while an appeal is 
pending or after it is decided. In eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,406 
the parties’ negotiation continued after the trial judge, on remand 
from the Supreme Court, denied eBay’s motion for an injunction.407 
The parties settled this bitter and protracted lawsuit.408  
F. Rule 4: Winner Pays 
We have examined three of the Cathedral article’s solutions: 
Rule 3 no-liability, holding for the defendant; Rule 1 granting the 
plaintiff an injunction; and Rule 2 awarding the plaintiff damages. 
The Cathedral article’s fourth solution is Rule 4, a hybrid remedy: 
the court grants the plaintiff an injunction, but it orders the 
“winning” plaintiff to pay the defendant, hence a “compensated 
injunction.”409  
In the universal example of Rule 4, the Arizona Supreme 
Court employed a compensated injunction in Spur Industries, Inc. 
v. Del E. Webb Development Co.410 Del Webb developed and built 
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Sun City, which catered to retired people in what was then a 
sparsely populated area near defendant’s cattle feedlot.411 The 
developer expanded its residential development toward 
defendant’s feedlot.412 Litigation followed in the advance’s wake.413  
Although the retired homeowners had “moved to the 
nuisance,” because of flies, insects, or disease, the feedlot was a 
nuisance.414 The homeowners were, the court held, entitled to an 
injunction.415 However, the homeowners’ position tempered the 
remedy.416 The court required the developer, who was more at fault 
than the homeowners, to pay defendant’s expenses of shutting 
down its feedlot and moving it.417 Although the court held that 
defendant’s feedlot was an enjoinable nuisance, it used defendant’s 
“coming-to-the-nuisance” defense at the remedy stage to require 
the developer-plaintiff to pay the cost of moving defendant’s feedlot 
away from residential areas.418 
Law school casebooks often include Spur after Boomer as a 
principal nuisance case.419 However, not even in a classroom 
hypothetical could we expect the homeowners in Boomer to be able 
to pay to move Atlantic Cement’s plant.420 Del Webb, the developer, 
was the source of the funds, not the homeowners; given time for a 
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transition, if no new calves were added and finished steers were 
sold, it wouldn’t be too complex and expensive for the feedlot to 
leave vacant lots where new lawns would be greener.421  
Spur “has not been followed by other courts.”422 The possibility 
of a plaintiff-pays solution would repel possible plaintiffs.423 
Because so far as a legal researcher can learn, no other court has 
ever followed it in private nuisance or trespass litigation, the 
attention scholars and casebook editors pay to Spur needs to be 
explained. Spur, if not a one-off solution, is an outlier.424 Is 
casebook coverage misplaced, even odd?425 Boomer and Spur, even 
if the instructor criticizes both, are beneficial teaching cases 
because they show students courts’ flexibility in choosing between 
damages and an injunction followed by developing the injunction’s 
terms.426 
In my opinion, the Spur approach also fails in private trespass 
and nuisance litigation because it doesn’t consider proportion, 
fairness, and the utility of the parties’ activity. Spur deserves to be 
isolated in private nuisance and trespass litigation because the 
notion that the winning plaintiff should pay the losing defendant 
destabilizes owners’ private property rights.427 Professor Richard 
Epstein called Rule 4 “[an] enormous risk,” “grotesque,” 
“misguided,” and “wholly subversive of any account of ordinary 
property rights.”428  
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Spur Industries’ compensated-nuisance injunction has joined 
nuisance parties’ post-injunction negotiation in law school 
classroom hypotheticals. But does it otherwise rest idly on the 
economists’ shelf?  
Rule 4, however, isn’t dead.429 A comprehensive, accurate view 
of legal reality includes settlements, other private remedies, and 
public regulation.430  
The parties in a land-use dispute could negotiate a Spur-type 
compensated injunction as a private settlement. Before mutual 
enmity develops, they might consider a plaintiff-pays-defendant 
solution when anticipated litigation costs will be high and the 
plaintiff’s gain from ending the defendant’s tort exceeds the 
defendant’s loss from ceasing its challenged activity.  
Another possible plaintiff-pays solution occurs in employment 
litigation about a former employee’s covenant not to disclose or 
compete. Requiring an employer who is enforcing a covenant 
against a former employee to pay the former employee’s salary and 
benefits during her period of unemployment, Ms. Passi uses the 
Rule 4 compensated injunction as an analogy to the United 
Kingdom doctrine of garden leave.431  
Finally, the Cathedral’s co-architect, Mr. Melamed, cites 
examples based on his experience in the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice, in the inner-beltway’s world of government 
regulation.432 These examples, he says, demonstrate that “Rule 4 
is alive and well—at least in Washington.”433  
Rule 4, however, should not qualify as a viable solution in 
assessing positive-law remedies for trespass and nuisance in 
private litigation.  
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IV. Rule 5: Does the Cathedral Have Too Many or 
Too Few Rooms? 
The Cathedral article’s four approaches are both too many and 
too few.  
A. Too Many Rooms 
The Cathedral article’s four approaches to remedies are too 
many because, as noted above, Rule 3, a court’s no-liability 
decision, isn’t a remedy.434 Also common law courts’ decisions that 
implement Rule 2, find a nuisance exists, decline to enjoin, and 
grant the plaintiff damages are scarce.435 Moreover, since the 
single example of Spur, Rule 4, the winner-pays, compensated 
injunction, is rare indeed today, perhaps extinct in private trespass 
and nuisance litigation.436 
B. Too Few Rooms 
The Cathedral doesn’t have enough rooms to house the court’s 
possible remedies for a defendant’s trespass or nuisance. In 
litigation that sheds light on the question of the defendant’s 
liability, as well as the choice of remedy, in 2007 in Fancher v. 
Fagella,437 the Virginia Supreme Court dealt with a next-door 
neighbor’s lawsuit about the defendant’s sweet-gum tree’s 
encroaching roots.438 The existing Virginia precedent for a 
neighbor’s tree-root invasion was a no-nuisance, Rule 3, approach 
that limited the encroached-upon landowner to self-help at the 
property line.439 The Virginia court, after concluding that the 
earlier precedent was obsolete in an urban setting,440 adopted a 
trespass-based substantive rule leading to the defendant’s liability 
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for an encroachment and to a possible injunctive remedy that 
hinged on the judge’s equitable discretion, exercised in the 
particular context.441   
After appearing to balance the hardships, the Boomer court 
had moved from an injunction remedy to a no-injunction remedy.442 
The Fancher court abandoned a no-remedy, no-injunction rule and 
adopted an opening for an injunction remedy.443 In the view taken 
here, Fancher’s liability decision and its broadened remedies 
present a superior approach for modern-day nuisance and trespass 
disputes as compared to Boomer v. Atlantic Cement’s move from an 
injunctive to a damages approach for a nuisance. 
We don’t know how later litigation and the Virginia trial 
judge’s equitable discretion might have resolved the choice of 
remedy because, shortly before the Virginia Supreme Court’s 
decision, Fagella, with a damages trial pending, cut down the 
aggressive sweet-gum, which effectively mooted Fancher’s prayer 
for an injunction.444  
This bemused observer speculates that if the dispute had 
continued to an injunction, Fancher and Fagella would have been 
less than effusive to negotiate a settlement. Between amiable 
neighbors, however, a negotiated settlement would eliminate the 
time and expense of litigation and, if the non-tree owner agreed to 
split the cost of removal, might include a “winner-pays” Rule 4 
feature.445  
1. The Standards Injunction 
The Boomer court’s bipolar choice between a shutdown 
injunction and damages is oversimplified. After selecting the 
plaintiff’s remedy, the second part of the court’s remedial analysis 
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is to measure and define that remedy.446 The judge’s choice of 
remedy is broader than either a shutdown injunction or permanent 
damages.447 Positing a court’s choice of remedy as one between a 
shuttering injunction and awarding permanent diminution 
damages overlooks the refinements that grow out of the distinction 
between a defendant’s permanent trespass or encroachment and 
its temporary continuing tort.  
The court’s injunction may take many forms. Both the Boomer 
court and the Cathedral article neglect an important intermediate 
possibility between the defendant’s continuation and its 
shut-down.  
A court may deal with the defendant’s nuisance by allowing it 
to continue operation after minimizing its harmful or offensive 
activity, a “standards” injunction.448 In 1927, Judge Learned Hand 
demonstrated this method of accommodating the conflicting 
interests of landowner and manufacturer in Smith v. Staso Milling 
Co.449 As Farber observed, the Boomer court’s majority opinion 
fails to consider the possibility of an injunction “that would 
mitigate the harm to the plaintiffs, such as a lower level of 
operation, changes in the scheduling of blasting, [or] construction 
of barriers between the plaintiff’s land and the plant.”450  
The judge has equitable discretion to employ a pragmatic 
experimental-conditional standards injunction that orders the 
defendant to add technology to control or reduce undesirable or 
unhealthy features as well as to limit the times and magnitude of 
operations and types of activity.451 The order may set time, place, 
and manner limits on pollution.452 The judge may require periodic 
reports and set timetables and goals.453  
The judge’s standards-injunction script may read something 
like this: call for the parties to negotiate a consent decree, to come 
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back to the courtroom with plans to abate and coordinate. Conduct 
a hearing on the parties’ plans or their proposed consent decree. 
Based on the best features of the plans, order the defendant to 
change the way it operates to end offensive features. Limit times, 
limit type of activity, require ameliorative devices. Call for a later 
periodic report. Set goals. Schedule another cycle of plans and 
hearings.  
The injunction will reserve the judge’s ability to modify the 
order in light of changed circumstances.454 Because of defendant’s 
improvements, the Iowa court, citing changed factual conditions, 
vacated an injunction that shut a cement plant down.455 The 
Supreme Court in 1907 granted the state of Georgia a “standards” 
injunction,456 which several years later became a 
stop-unless-standards-are-met injunction.457 
The standards injunction resembles a structural injunction in 
constitutional litigation. The structural injunction is a judicial 
technique to bring a large and complex institution into compliance 
with the law.458 Courts have used structural injunctions to end 
school segregation where it was required or permitted.459 Another 
branch of the structural injunction, developed by courts in 
Arkansas in the 1970s, brought prisons and jails into compliance 
with the law.460 Industrial pollution is another large and complex 
legal problem that is amenable to the structural injunction process.  
Courts’ experience with structural injunctions against 
government defendants should convince judges that concern about 
supervision, about becoming managers rather than judges, is 
exaggerated.461 
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In the 1970s, courts didn’t have as much experience managing 
institutions as they do today. Federal school-desegregation 
litigation in the South was emerging from freedom-of-choice;462 
courts had not begun to grant complex prison injunctions.463 
Perhaps in the early 1970s, the New York Court of Appeals wasn’t 
ready to transfer judicial experience in operating institutions to 
industrial management and pollution control. That time has 
passed; the time is ripe for courts to grant structural-standards 
injunctions to ameliorate and control pollution. 
2. Damages 
A nuisance plaintiff’s damages aren’t a set amount, 
diminution, or value before less value after. In 2016, Judge 
Calabresi rejected the idea that the nuisance plaintiff’s damages 
“should mimic or approach the negotiated price that would obtain 
in a free market.”464 Instead damages might vary according to 
“collective” judgments, sometimes below, sometimes equaling, 
sometimes above compensatory damages levels.465 The court can 
consider a plaintiff’s special damages, her personal injury 
damages, and damages based on buffer-zone value.466 The Iowa 
court, after first balancing the hardships to refuse plaintiffs an 
injunction,467 then added special damages to their permanent 
diminution damages: the plaintiffs’ temporary damages may be 
rent-based and include their discomfort.468 
Farber wrote that a judge who denies a nuisance plaintiff an 
injunction should measure his money recovery by the market value 
for buffer-zone rights instead of by value before less value after.469 
On remand, Atlantic Cement, perhaps prodded by the trial court’s 
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apparent buffer-zone measure of damages, bought out most of the 
plaintiffs to create the buffer zone that some observers think it 
should have purchased before it built its cement plant.470  
Courts have flexible injunction-damages options for nuisance 
and trespass remedies. Consider, for example, the spectrum of 
options that the trial judge in Harrison, discussed above, had for 
defendant’s automobile shredder after the Court of Appeals 
remanded.471 The options included: (a) The judge could find that no 
nuisance exists; (b) The judge could change the earlier permanent 
nuisance decision to a temporary nuisance with temporary 
damages dating from its beginning to the date of trial and a 
shut-down injunction stopping the shredder’s hammers in the 
future; (c) The judge could find a temporary nuisance, award the 
homeowners damages down to the date of trial, and let plaintiffs 
sue for damages in the future if defendant’s nuisance continued; or 
(d) The judge could find a permanent nuisance and refuse to grant 
plaintiffs an injunction, but award plaintiffs permanent damages 
for the diminished value of their property, the solution in 
Boomer.472 The Court of Appeals seemed to favor (e) an 
experimental-conditional standards injunction as discussed 
above.473  
The court’s possible remedial solutions for a defendant’s 
trespass or nuisance aren’t limited to the injunctions and 
compensatory damages that this Article has considered above. Two 
other money remedies for a successful plaintiff are punitive 
damages and restitution. 
3. Punitive Damages 
A nuisance or trespass plaintiff may recover punitive 
damages.474 Punitive damages add complex recalculation to our 
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topic.475 Judge Calabresi wrote in 2016 that punitive damages 
deter short of a criminal sanction and approach inalienability.476 
Professor Henry Smith wrote that “supra-compensatory” punitive 
damages convert a “liability” or damages rule into a “property” or 
injunction rule.477  
“Inalienability” and “supra-compensatory” aren’t accurate 
ways to describe punitive damages.478 A court will impose punitive 
damages after, perhaps long after, the defendant’s tort.479 Courts 
base punitive damages on an entirely different policy foundation 
than compensatory damages. A court awards a plaintiff punitive 
damages to punish the defendant’s completed, aggravated wrong, 
nuisance or trespass, and to deter that defendant and others from 
similar misconduct in the future.480 Punitive damages don’t affect 
alienability. On the other hand, the judge grants the plaintiff an 
injunction to forbid the defendant’s future misconduct.481  
Considering several ways to measure a nuisance plaintiff’s 
compensatory damages helps us to understand that punitive 
damages don’t prevent alienation and aren’t an injunction. In 
Boomer, the lowest compensatory general damages measure was 
value before less value after, apparently the trial judge’s initial 
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$185,000.482 The damages measure based on the defendant’s cost 
to secure a buffer zone was $710,000, which was result on 
remand.483 A defendant like Atlantic Cement with a $45 million 
investment would clearly prefer to pay either measure of 
compensatory damages instead of an injunction.484 A court would 
have to add a gigantic punitive damages verdict to the 
compensatory damages to take the plaintiff’s money recovery out 
of the realm of damages and into the realm of an injunction.  
4. Restitution 
In addition to an injunction, compensatory damages, and 
punitive damages, a court’s major remedy is restitution to reverse 
or prevent the defendant’s unjust enrichment, a remedy that the 
Cathedral article does not discuss. Courts have based several 
important restitution decisions on defendants’ property torts, 
conversions and trespasses.485  
When a court discusses a plaintiff’s nuisance remedies, 
however, the traditional answer has been that that the nuisance 
plaintiff’s money recovery comprises only compensatory damages 
and perhaps punitive damages, but does not include restitution.486 
Should a contemporary court expand its nuisance-remedies 
options to include awarding the plaintiff restitution? A positive 
answer follows.  
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Taking a fresh look in 1997, Professor Andrew Kull wrote that 
“restitution for the economic benefits [defendant] derived from a 
private nuisance makes a perfectly intelligible claim in any case 
where the nuisance could have been enjoined, so long as the 
defendant can be shown to have acted willfully in invading the 
plaintiff’s property.”487 A few years later, after Kull became 
Reporter for the Third Restatement of Restitution, the 
Restatement included an Illustration based on Boomer’s facts.488 
The Illustration concludes that for the defendant’s nuisance, “the 
court might award [plaintiffs] restitution . . . measured by the 
reasonable value of a license . . . to continue the [defendant’s] 
challenged operations.”489  
Professor Farber also formulated a restitution remedy for the 
Boomer nuisance plaintiffs: if the trial court had measured 
plaintiff’s money recovery by the amount an ordinary buyer would 
have had to pay, that measure would have been a bargain for a 
buyer like Atlantic Cement that was assembling a large tract.490  
[Atlantic] would be unjustly enriched in the amount of the 
premium it would otherwise have had to pay for the buffer zone. 
Thus the [plaintiffs’ buffer-zone] damage award can be 
considered a form of restitution, putting the parties in the same 
position that they would have been in if Atlantic had done the 
right thing in the first place and purchased a buffer zone.491  
Farber’s formulation isn’t easy to fit into technical restitution 
learning.492 Perhaps a better way to articulate a restitution 
measure for nuisance or trespass that reaches the same result is 
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the Restatement’s: to measure the plaintiff’s restitution by the 
reasonable value of a license.493  
Both punitive damages and restitution are potential remedies 
for a defendant’s trespass or nuisance, opening a new wing on the 
Cathedral.  
V. Procedure, the Jury, and Equitable Cleanup 
Whether the judge ought to grant the plaintiff an injunction 
or award him damages and how to combine and measure the 
remedies follows a tricky procedural path that complicates the 
judge’s remedial decisions in nuisance and trespass litigation. 
Avoiding a jury may explain the form of relief.  
To begin with, a dispute where the plaintiff sought both an 
injunction and damages was complex to try earlier because of 
separate courts of Chancery or Equity and Common Law.494 Before 
the separate courts of Chancery-Equity and Common Law were 
merged, two trials might have been necessary, one in Chancery for 
an injunction and another at Common Law for damages.495  
The federal and almost all state court systems have merged 
the Chancery and Common Law courts.496 Merger of Chancery and 
Common Law means only one potential plenary trial on the 
plaintiff’s nuisance or trespass claims because the merged court 
has power to award a successful plaintiff damages and to enter an 
injunction.497 The litigants’ constitutional right to a jury trial for 
damages adds procedural and remedial complexity.498  
In a merged court, if the plaintiff moves for interlocutory 
equitable relief, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary 
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injunction, the judge will conduct a juryless pre-trial hearing, then 
grant or deny the plaintiff’s motion.499  
At the plenary trial where the plaintiff seeks both damages 
and an injunction, either party would be entitled to a 
constitutional jury trial on the plaintiff’s claim for money damages, 
but neither party has a jury-trial right for the plaintiff’s demand 
for an injunction or other equitable relief.500 The judge may, 
however, empanel an advisory jury to evaluate the equitable 
claims.501  
Professor Klass’s experience supported the idea that a 
carefully instructed jury could sort out complex multiple 
substantive claims.502 Suppose a jury trial ends with a plaintiff’s 
jury verdict that a nuisance exists and the amount of the plaintiff’s 
past damages. Then the judge alone would decide whether to grant 
the plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction.503 If there had 
been an advisory jury, the judge would decide whether to accept 
the jury’s advisory findings.504 Under federal and some state 
precedents, the judge’s permanent-injunction decision must be 
consistent with the jury’s findings of fact.505 If the judge were to 
refuse to grant the plaintiff a permanent injunction, the jury could 
be recalled to set the plaintiff’s permanent or future damages.  
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Equitable cleanup is a second one-trial possibility which many 
state courts would follow.506 The judge hears the parties’ evidence 
in Chancery without a jury and decides the defendant’s 
substantive liability and whether to grant the plaintiff a 
permanent injunction.507 Then the judge will “clean the case up,” 
that is decide the damages issues also without a jury.508 The 
skeptics’ question about equitable cleanup is whether, in aid of 
consistency and judicial economy, it undervalues the litigants’ 
constitutional rights to a jury trial.509  
The Boomer majority quoted the Indiana court’s Vesey 
equitable-cleanup decision:  
When the trial court refused injunctive relief to the [plaintiff] 
upon the ground of public interest in the continuance of the gas 
plant, it properly retained jurisdiction of the case and awarded 
full compensation to the [plaintiff]. This is upon the general 
equitable principle that equity will give full relief in one action 
and prevent a multiplicity [of suits].510  
Approving a conditional injunction as part of equitable 
cleanup, the Alabama court observed that “a court of equity has 
power to mold its relief to meet the equities developed in the 
trial.”511  
The form of relief in Boomer has puzzled observers.512 As 
mentioned above, the court granted plaintiffs an injunction but 
stayed its effect as long as the defendant paid plaintiffs’ 
damages.513 Laycock questioned the court’s “circumlocution” for 
refusing an injunction.514 He speculated that the conditional 
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injunction may have allowed the judge to retain jurisdiction and 
supervise the cement company while it ameliorated its nuisance.515 
Another possibility in Boomer is that the court may have used the 
conditional injunction to keep the lawsuit in Chancery-Equity in 
order to grant the plaintiff permanent damages instead of an 
injunction without a jury.516 More specifically, granting the 
injunction and suspending it may have rationalized equitable 
cleanup and lack of a jury.517  
VI. Conclusion 
Every profession has its array of public perceptions that are 
widely held, deeply believed, and oft-stated but, at best, 
misleading; in legal-latin, these are ignis fatuus, delusive guiding 
principles. In aid of expanding and broadening the injunction 
remedy, this Article has challenged a well-established way of 
looking at the law of nuisance and trespass. It has criticized the 
Boomer decision518 and the Cathedral article519 and suggested 
refinements that increase plaintiffs’ injunctions.520 By proving an 
existing theory wrong, we refine our understanding of what our 
models can and cannot explain. 
The Boomer decision and the Cathedral article are influential 
sources. Timely and easy to understand, both were formative for 
law-and-economics scholars who were ready for their powerful 
simplicity and conservative, business-protective solutions.521 Have 
they stood the test of time?  
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An analogy from science to law invoked by Thomas Kuhn’s The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions522 will be evocative here. A 
comfortable intellectual life favors an exemplar or paradigm like 
the Cathedral article’s four-category system that enables people to 
think that a piece of the world makes sense.523 But as things 
change, shift happens. Anomalies accumulate that do not make 
sense within the earlier paradigm. The conventional wisdom is 
durable, not shaken by a few unexplained applications. The 
paradigm changes only when insiders believe that the current 
paradigm doesn’t explain many anomalies. When a set of ideas is 
no longer up to the task of explaining the world and needs to be 
replaced, people develop a new bundle of beliefs to put events in a 
different light. 
This Article maintains that analysis based on the Cathedral 
article needs to be refined.524 It places liability after remedy.525 It 
combines remedy and liability.526 The real world is complex and 
nuanced instead of being primary and theoretical. The parties’ 
post-injunction negotiation may, but doesn’t always, occur. The 
four-category world of solutions is both too simple and not simple 
enough. Despite the scholarly “cottage industry,”527 it doesn’t 
describe court decisions or positive law. Instead it points courts in 
the wrong remedial direction. The faulty theorizing in law schools 
has diverted teaching and scholarship into theoretical 
conundrums. Human nature is too ambiguous and variable to 
explain with all-purpose microeconomic analysis based on 
cash-preferred motives.  
A 2011 “concise” property casebook “suitable and teachable in 
a one-semester Property course” may foreshadow what the future 
portends.528 Both Boomer and Spur are reduced to footnote status; 
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moreover, the nuisance material does not cite the Cathedral 
article.529 The 2017 edition of a Remedies casebook references 
Boomer only within another principle decision.530 New ideas begin 
to percolate through the profession and the academy and fall into 
place. But the change comes slowly because people who are 
mentally within the former paradigm cannot understand what is 
happening. Many will continue to reason “Cathedral all the way 
down,” that is, the court should favor damages because an 
injunction is absolute protection, a stone wall, and the court should 
prefer a “liability rule” that merely “discourages violations” 
because litigants will bargain around an injunction.531  
“[Q]uarrels over language and terminology mask, and 
sometimes reveal, quarrels over world view . . . .”532 Changing 
nomenclature changes ideas.533 So, more than changing the 
profession’s vocabulary, I wrote this Article to change the way the 
profession thinks about the issues involved in nuisance and 
trespass remedies. It doesn’t seek merely new categories but to 
break the mold to develop a more functional approach.  
“[R]eorganizing a field of law,” Laycock wrote, “is hard—hard 
to figure out, hard to disseminate, hard to implement.”534 The law’s 
creative-destructive process never ends. An optimist seconds Lord 
Mansfield’s observation that, in the long run, “the common 
law . . . works itself pure . . . .”535 
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REHABILITATING THE NUISANCE INJUNCTION 1943 
Number six in all-time citations, the iconic Cathedral article 
has a well-established place in the firmament.536 As the late 
Professor Leach reminded us, however, “great men and their great 
books create problems. They tend to freeze things in antique 
patterns.”537 I don’t entertain for an instant the notion that this 
modest piece will overthrow two generations of vested intellectual 
interest, entrenched “knowledge,” and vocabulary about nuisance 
and trespass remedies. Nobel-prize winning economist Tom 
Schelling reminded us that “[t]he lesson that may need to be 
learned over and over, a lesson that possibly no one can ever apply, 
is the extraordinary difficulty of pulling out of a situation in which 
one has invested heavily.”538 But I do hope that this modest effort 
will play a part in a process of refining and displacing outmoded 
analysis. For one thing, our law students are confused enough. 
Their professors should exit the four-room Cathedral and refute its 
analysis. This Article may be the last tour of the Cathedral they 
need to take. 
This Article is part of a process of creative reconstruction of 
granting injunctions in nuisance, trespass, and other 
environmental litigation. The court should ask three questions. 
First, is the defendant liable under properly defined substantive 
law? Second, what remedy should the court grant; an injunction, 
compensatory damages, or perhaps punitive damages and 
restitution? Balancing the parties’ hardships may be necessary to 
choose between damages and an injunction, but a narrow and 
precise test is a crucial principle of confinement. Finally, how 
should the court measure or define the injunction or money 
recovery? Questions two and three will not always be discrete or 
separate. The judge might consider what an injunction ought to 
require or forbid along with whether to grant it. Denying a 
nuisance or trespass plaintiff an injunction may often be unsound 
for health or environmental reasons. A standards injunction may 
be the most propitious remedy. 
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A reinvigorated private law remedial approach may counter 
the federal regulatory retreat. More and more detailed standard 
injunctions in private litigation will improve our shared 
environment; moreover, the private-law example may work its way 
into public-law environmental litigation, where it may contribute 
to reducing global warming and climate change. 
